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ABSTRACT
Stress is widely considered to have detrimental effects on both our physical 
and psychological wellbeing. For this reason, a variety of disciplines have 
contributed to research into this topic. However, this research has typically focused 
on the individual and his or her emotional and cognitive processes without adequately 
understanding the role of social factors and the social context. This thesis examines 
the role of social factors by applying self-categorization principles to Lazarus and 
Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress. Three experiments were designed 
where participants had to perform mental arithmetic tasks that were intended to be 
potentially stressful and result in threat appraisal.
The first experiment explored the benefits of receiving informational support 
from a person who shares the same social identity as the stress sufferer (an ingroup 
member). In this experiment, participants (N = 58) completed an initial set of 
arithmetic tasks and then indicated how they felt during the task on measures to assess 
the stress response. Before completing another set of arithmetic tasks participants 
received feedback from either an individual in the personal identity condition or 
ingroup member in the social identity condition. After completing the second set of 
arithmetic tasks participants rated the stress response again. The results supported the 
a priori predictions that the benefits of informational support depend upon the 
appraiser and provider of the support sharing a salient social identity. The second 
experiment was conducted to replicate Experiment 1 and strengthen the manipulation 
of social identity salience and increase the power of the experiment by increasing the 
sample size (A = 79). Here, though, the benefits of informational support were not
only evident for participants in social identity condition but also for participants in the 
personal identity condition.
In the third experiment, the arithmetic tasks were intended to be identity - 
relevant or identity-irrelevant to the participants’ personal identity or social identity 
(N = 78). The aims were threefold: (1) to examine how the impact of a stressor varies 
as a function of its perceived relevance and importance to self, (2) to examine the 
benefits of receiving informational support about the testing situation that is relevant 
to self from a person who shares the same social identity and (3) to ensure the 
provision of informational support lowers the stress response. The results did not 
support the hypothesis that the benefits of receiving feedback are restricted to 
conditions were the stress appraiser and provider share a salient social identity. 
Further, the experiment failed to demonstrate the difference between identity-relevant 
and identity-irrelevant stressors. Finally, though, in support of the predictions, there 
was evidence to suggest that the lowering of the stress response was not due to a 
practice effect.
Methodological problems with the current research are discussed and it is 
concluded that, even though the findings are tentative and varied, they do suggest that 
self-categorization principles play a role in the cognitive appraisal of stress. That is, 
the social context in which individuals find themselves may influence the appraisal of 
stress situations. Clearly, further research is warranted to provide a more accurate 
amalgamation of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress and 
self-categorization principles (Turner, 1982, 1987, 1991). Future research needs to 
consider the methodological and measurement issues raised by the present thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction and Overview of the Thesis
Stress is a major topic of interest because of its importance for our social, 
physiological and psychological wellbeing. It has long been thought that stress can 
have detrimental effects on both our physical and mental health. For this reason, 
many theorists and a variety of disciplines have contributed to research into this topic. 
Traditional psychological models of stress vary in regard to what they see as the 
central component of stress. Some have placed importance on the external stressful 
event or stressor, while other models have focused on the stress response or reaction. 
The former represents a stimulus-oriented account (Holmes & Rahe, 1967), the latter 
a response-oriented account (Seyle, 1956). However, stimulus and response accounts 
of stress fail to consider adequately the interaction between the person and 
environment and, in addition, they fail to capture adequately the person in the stress 
equation. They do not consider the meaning or interpretation of the situation for the 
individual (Dergotis & Coon, 1993; Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984;
Monroe & Kelley, 1995). As a result, disillusionment with stimulus and response 
accounts has led to alternative transactional models of stress.
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) presented one of the most prominent 
transactional accounts of the stress process. Central to this theory is the cognitive 
process of appraisal. For Lazarus and Folkman (1984), stress arises from a dynamic 
relationship between the person and environment where the cognitive appraisal 
intervenes between the environment and the subsequent experience of a stressful 
situation. Stress results when the person perceives they will not be able to cope with a
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situation that they define as personally relevant and important. Put simply, in order 
for a situation to be considered stressful it needs to be perceived as such by the 
individual. Lazarus and colleagues (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus, Opton, Nomikos & 
Rankin, 1965; Speisman, Lazarus, Mordkoff & Davison, 1964) have consistently 
demonstrated the role of cognitive appraisal in the stress process. They have found 
that different emotions and physiological reactions result from varying the person’s 
appraisal of a situation.
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) make the distinction between two types of 
cognitive appraisal: primary and secondary appraisal. Primary appraisal refers to the 
evaluation of the situation in terms of its significance for the individual’s wellbeing, 
while secondary appraisal refers to the individual’s evaluation of the coping resources 
and options available to deal with stressful situations. A transactional account of the 
stress process suggests that it is the combination of primary and secondary appraisals 
in interaction with the person and environment that ultimately determines the 
psychological reaction. Appraisal and coping processes are closely intertwined and 
hence the appraisal of a stressful situation instigates the choice of appropriate 
cognitive and behavioural coping efforts. It is in this area of the coping literature that 
more recent reference has been made to the potential for social factors to impact on 
the stress process. Prior to this, researchers focused solely on the individual and his 
or her emotional and cognitive processes (Pearlin, 1993).
Acknowledgment of the importance of social factors is central to the literature 
on social support. Social support has received a considerable amount of empirical 
attention because it is thought to have a beneficial effect on wellbeing and to reduce 
the harmful effects of stress. Many theorists have proffered different 
conceptualisations of social support (Cohen & Syme, 1985; Gore, 1985, Hobfoll &
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Vaux, 1993; Kessler and McLeod, 1985; Thoits, 1982, Turner, 1981). Cohen and 
Wills (1985) outline four explicit functions of a social support network. Specifically, 
a social support network can provide the individual with one or more of the following: 
(a) a sense of self-worth and acceptance (emotional support), (b) material and 
financial resources (instrumental support), (c) information useful in understanding and 
coping with stressful events (informational support), and finally (d) social 
companionship. According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984) one way in which social 
support may intervene in the stress process is by influencing the appraisal of 
potentially stressful events. When drawing attention to informational support (also 
known as appraisal support) individuals are provided with the opportunity to compare 
their reactions with others, to help them either clarify their understanding or allow for 
new interpretations of potentially stressful events. This suggests that the social 
context in which individuals find themselves may influence the stress process. In this 
vein, there is clearly scope for a better understanding of the role of social influence in 
the stress process. This is the central goal of this thesis.
The role of social influence in the stress process has mainly been examined 
through an application of social comparison theory (after Festinger, 1954). Social 
comparison theory asserts that people turn to others who they see as similar in order 
to gain information (i.e., engaging in social reality testing) only when objective and 
non-social information (physical reality testing) is not available. Essentially, 
individual perception is seen as primary and valid whereas social influence is 
secondary, unreliable and only used as an extension of individual perception. On this 
basis, individuals are assumed only to influence others by virtue of the (asocial) valid 
information they possess and thus the influence of social support in the appraisal of 
stressful situations has been assumed to depend simply on its informational content.
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However, more recently, researchers have questioned whether physical reality 
testing takes place in isolation from social reality testing and whether social reality 
testing really is secondary or optional (Turner, 1987, 1991). Furthermore, it has been 
argued that it is not the informational content per se of others that influences the 
appraisal of stressful events, but the extent to which that content is validated by social 
psychological means -  with relevant others in the context of a shared reality (Turner, 
1987, 1991; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994; see also McGarty, Haslam, 
Hutchinson & Turner, 1994). To put this another way, informational support should 
influence cognitive appraisal only when it is provided to the appraiser by a person 
who is seen to be qualified to inform him or her about social reality because they 
share the same social identity (i.e., when that person is seen to be an ingroup 
member). Consistent with this analysis, the purpose of this thesis is to enhance our 
understanding of the stress process by understanding the role of social identity 
salience in the appraisal of stressful situations
The concept of social identity (Tajfel, 1975, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) was 
developed as part of an attempt to foster an interactionist approach to social 
psychology. Within this tradition, social identity theory was initially developed to 
provide an analysis of intergroup differentiation by examining the emotional and 
value significance of group membership. Later, self-categorization theory was 
developed to provide a better understanding of the general principles that govern and 
predict when people will define themselves in terms of a personal or social identity 
(Turner, 1987, 1991; Turner et al., 1994). The principles of self-categorization 
theory are particularly pertinent to this thesis.
In brief, the theory postulates that a person’s self-concept may be defined in 
terms of their unique and individual characteristics (their personal identity) and at
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other times in terms of shared social group memberships (their social identity). Thus, 
when a social identity becomes salient people tend to perceive themselves less in 
terms of their personal differences and individuality and more in terms of attributes 
that define them as members of an ingroup. Moreover, the effects of social identity 
salience will be most pronounced when a person identifies with an ingroup and 
internalises that group membership as an aspect of their self-concept. Self­
categorization theory also proposes that our personal and social identities are both true 
and valid expressions of the self (McGarty et al., 1994, Turner et al., 1994).
However, it is important to note that to date very little research has examined the 
impact of social identity salience in the cognitive appraisal process.
1.1 The present program of research
This thesis examines the role of social identity salience at two different stages 
of the stress process. First, it is suggested that social identity principles can help 
develop our understanding of why a potentially stressful situation is appraised as 
relevant or irrelevant to an individual. The stress literature postulates that a situation 
will be appraised as stressful when it is relevant and meaningful to the person’s 
wellbeing. From a social identity perspective, a situation will be appraised as 
stressful when it is relevant to the self-concept which includes both one’s personal 
identity and social identities. Thus, the impact of a stressor will vary as a function of 
its perceived relevance and importance to self To reiterate, for a situation to be 
appraised as stressful it must be perceived as relevant or important to one’s personal 
identity or social identity. Hence, a situation will be appraised as relevant or 
irrelevant to the self depending on the context and how the self is defined in a given 
context. Second, social support in the form of information about a stressful situation
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should influence the cognitive appraisal process and any accompanying stress reaction 
when it is provided to the appraiser by a person who is seen to be qualified to inform 
him or her about social reality. Thus, the provision, receipt and benefits of social 
support should be evident when the source and appraiser share the same social 
identification (and accompanying perspective) in the context in which the support is 
provided. For this reason, the benefits of social support should be dependent upon the 
extent to which the person identifies with the provider, perceives him or her as an 
ingroup member and internalises that group membership as an aspect of their self- 
concept. Previous research demonstrates the importance of matching the support to 
the type of stressor (Hobfoll & Vaux, 1993; Cohen &Wills, 1985, Cohen & McKay, 
1984; Turner, 1981). The approach presented here acknowledges the importance of 
matching the support to the stressor but provides a more parsimonious account by 
explaining the underlying process from a social identity perspective.
In summary, the benefits of informational support are argued to be dependent 
upon the extent to which the individual identifies with the provider. Some evidence 
to support this comes from research in which Jacobs and Haslam (2000) found that 
when participants were informed that a testing situation was challenging as opposed 
to stressful from an ingroup member (another student) they perceived the situation as 
less stressful. However, the same effect was not apparent when participants were 
informed about the testing situation from a person they thought was an outgroup 
member (a stress sufferer). Taken together, we assert that the above analysis has the 
potential to enrich our understanding of the cognitive appraisal of stress.
In order to test these arguments three experiments were conducted in which 
participants had to perform mental arithmetic tasks that were intended to be 
potentially stressful. The first experiment explored the benefits of receiving
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informational support from a person who shares the same social identity as the 
participant (an ingroup member). The second experiment was conducted to replicate 
Experiment 1 and strengthen the manipulation of social identity salience and increase 
the power of the experiment by increasing the sample size. The aims of the final 
study were threefold. First, to examine how the impact of a stressor can vary as a 
function of its perceived relevance and importance to self. Second, to examine the 
benefits of receiving informational support about the testing situation that is relevant 
to the self from a person who shares the same social identity as the participant (an 
ingroup member). Third, to ensure that it is the provision of feedback that lowers the 
stress response rather than a practice effect.
The first experiment was designed to explore the benefits of receiving 
informational support when the stressor was identity-relevant. In this experiment, 
self-definition varied across two levels with participants being assigned to either a 
personal identity or social identity condition. Participants were required to complete 
an initial set of arithmetic tasks (study phase 1) and then indicate how they felt during 
the task on measures of stress. Before completing another set of arithmetic tasks 
(study phase 2) participants either received feedback that was intended to be 
supportive from an individual in the personal identity condition or ingroup member in 
the social identity condition. After completing the second set of arithmetic tasks 
participants rated their stress response again. It was hypothesised that the stress 
response should lower across the two sets of tasks in the social identity condition 
where the participant receives informational support from another participant who 
shares the same social identity -  an ingroup member. However, the same pattern 
should not occur in the personal identity condition where the participant receives
feedback from another individual.
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Consistent with the a priori predictions, the results indicated that the stress 
response across the two tasks lowered significantly only for participants in the social 
identity condition. This suggests that the benefits of informational social support are 
contingent upon the sufferer identifying with the provider of support and perceiving 
them both to share a salient social identity. However, due to lack of statistical power, 
the results failed to obtain the predicted interaction between self-definition and study 
phase. In the second experiment, statistical power was improved by strengthening the 
self-definition manipulation and increasing the sample size. Here, though, the results 
indicated that the stress response lowered significantly across the two sets of 
arithmetic tasks for participants in the social identity condition but also for 
participants in the personal identity condition. The results of this experiment were 
attributed to the lack of ecological validity and relevance of performing the arithmetic 
tasks in an experimental context. The possibility of a practice effect being responsible 
for the results could also not be mied out. Notwithstanding these results, there was 
evidence for the success of social identity salience and a trend indicating that 
participants in the social identity’ condition found the feedback more supportive.
Because of the methodological issues outlined above the final experiment was 
designed to assess for the possibility of a practice effect and increase the potential 
threat of the stressor. There were three general hypotheses. First, the participants’ 
experience of stress will be high only in conditions where the arithmetic tasks are 
relevant to their self-definition. Second, the stress response should lower across the 
two sets of tasks only when participants receive feedback from someone who shares 
the same social identity -  an ingroup member. Third, the stress response should not 
lower across the two sets of tasks when participants receive no feedback. The 
experiment failed to demonstrate the difference between identity-relevant and
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identity-irrelevant stressors. All of the participants reported moderate levels of stress 
during the first set of tasks. The results also showed that the stress response lowered 
in conditions where participants received feedback and in the social identity no 
feedback condition. Therefore, there was no evidence that the benefits of receiving 
feedback were restricted to conditions where the provider shared a salient social 
identity with the appraiser. Participants in both the personal identity and social 
identity conditions who received feedback reported less stress during the second set of 
arithmetic tasks. Finally, the stress response did not reduce in the personal identity no 
feedback condition and this provides support for stress not lowering simply as a result 
of a practice effect.
Considered as a whole, this thesis represents an initial attempt to clarify the 
role of social influence and social identity salience in the appraisal of stressful 
situations. It provides a parsimonious account of the cognitive process of appraisal by 
explaining the underlying process from a social identity perspective. Even though the 
results are mixed, the thesis does suggest that the social context in which individuals 
find themselves has the capacity to influence the appraisal of stressful situations.
The following chapters present a review of the relevant literature on stress and 
the social identity approach. We will then present an integrated model to enhance our 
understanding of the transactional stress process by clarifying the role of social 
identity salience and social influence. Two empirical chapters then explore the role of 
social identity in the cognitive appraisal process in the manner outlined above and the 
thesis concludes by considering the broader implications and the value of the social 
identity approach to the study of the stress process as a whole. We conclude that the 
approach has a great deal to offer to this field, and that some tentative support for this 
view is provided by our empirical studies, while noting that further investigation is
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clearly warranted. Consideration is given to the paths that this may take, particularly 
in the light of the methodological and measurement issues raised by the present 
research.
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Stress Process
The word “stress” continues to generate an abundance of interest because of 
its importance for our social, physiological and psychological wellbeing. One can 
hear about the topic of stress in daily conversations, via the media, at conferences and 
workshops, through university courses and in fact, in almost every facet of life. Many 
disciplines have contributed to this interest; physiology, sociology, anthropology, and 
psychology to name just a few. Briefly, a physiological analysis of stress is 
concerned with the workings of the body (e.g., the nervous system), sociological and 
anthropological analyses deal primarily with the role of society, while a psychological 
analysis of stress is specifically interested in the individual mind and behaviour.
Partly as a result of this range of approaches, the way in which stress has been defined 
in the research literature has not been consistent. This has led to considerable 
confusion and debate within the stress research literature (Breznitz & Goldberger, 
1993; Eckenrode, 1991; Pearlin, 1993).
The word “stress” originated from the engineering analysis of stress that was 
developed in the late 17th century (Lazarus, 1966, 1999; Vingerhoets, 1985). In 
essence, the engineering analysis drew upon three concepts, load, stress, and strain. 
Load referred to any external force; stress to the area of the physical object over 
which this force is applied; and strain was seen as the result of this force, which may 
cause temporary or permanent changes in the structure of the object. When the 
engineering analysis of stress is compared to 20th centuiy models of stress, one can
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see load as analogous to an external stressful event or stressor and strain as analogous 
to a stress response or reaction (Lazarus, 1999).
The goal of this chapter is to focus on Lazarus and Folkman’s transactional 
account of the stress process as this theory is of considerable relevance to the 
theoretical framework presented in this thesis. Two integral components of this 
theory will be reviewed: the cognitive process of appraisal and the coping process. 
The discussion will also consider the emotions associated with the appraisal process. 
It is within the coping literature, in particular as it relates to the issue of social 
support, that reference is first made to the potential for social factors to impact on the 
stress process. Thus, the topic of social support will be reviewed prior to a general 
discussion of the strengths and limitations of established models of the stress process. 
We will start, though, with a brief discussion of the traditional stimulus and response 
models of stress as their contribution to the stress literature led to the development of 
transactional models of stress.
2.1 Traditional psychological models of stress
Theoretical approaches vary in regard to what they see as the central 
ingredient of psychological stress. Some place importance on the external stressful 
event or stressor, others on the stress response or reaction, while some emphasise 
individuals’ interpretation of the situation and the meaning it assumes for them. 
Traditionally, psychological stress has been defined in two main ways, stimulus- 
oriented and response-oriented (Dergotis & Coon, 1993; Houston, 1987; Lazarus, 
1966, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Vingerhoets, 1985).
In the first instance, stimulus-oriented definitions place an emphasis on 
stressful events and aspects of the stimulus environment which increase demands
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upon the individual. Here something has to happen within the environment to 
provoke stress reactions and subsequently the need to cope (Dergotis & Coon, 1993). 
Stressful life changes and events, such as divorce, job loss, and death of a loved one 
are used to explain disturbed emotional reactions. The Holmes-Rahe Schedule of 
Recent Experience (SRE) questionnaire (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) is a commonly used 
tool that draws upon a stimulus-oriented approach. The SRE consists of a list of 43 
significant life events developed from isolating the life events experienced from a 
large group of patients just prior to the onset of illness (Holmes & Rahe, 1967). On 
the other hand, response-oriented definitions applied in both physiology and medicine 
view stress as the “troubled set of reactions” to stressful stimuli. Thus, a disturbed 
bodily or mental state is seen as stress in response terms. Hans Seyle (1956) 
formulated one of the most prominent modem theories of physiological stress. 
According to Seyle, stress is defined as the non-specific response of the body to any 
noxious stimulus, with more recent definitions replacing “any noxious stimulus” with 
“any noxious demand” (Seyle, 1993). This response, called the General Adaptation 
Syndrome, is a universal set of physiological stress reactions. The set of reactions 
may include increased adreno-cortical activity, degeneration of the thymus and 
lymphatic structures, and hemorrhage and ulceration of the stomach and other parts of 
the gastrointestinal tract (Seyle, 1956, 1993; Vingerhoets, 1985).
Although stimulus and response approaches differ in their conceptualisation of 
stress, Cohen, Kessler & Gordon (1995) note that they still share a common thread 
insofar as both approaches are interested in a process in which “environmental 
demands tax or exceed the adaptive capacity of an organism, resulting in 
psychological and biological changes that may place persons at risk of disease” (p. 3).
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2.1.1 The limitation of stimulus/response approaches
Despite their attractions, key problems with traditional stimulus or response 
accounts of the stress process are that they fail to consider, either (a) the interaction 
between these two variables or (b) the role of the person in the stress process 
(Lazarus, 1999, Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler & Ernst, 
1997). Hence, more recent accounts of the stress process consider the dynamic and 
mutually reciprocal interaction between the person and the environment. This 
relationship is seen as dynamic because its characteristics can change over time and 
circumstance. Further, it is reciprocal because not only is the environment seen to 
affect the person but so too the person is seen as having the capacity to influence the 
environment (Lazarus, 1991a; Vingerhoets, 1985). However, despite the importance 
of the interaction between the person and the environment, it is also imperative to 
consider the person’s evaluation of the relational meaning and interpretation of their 
interaction with the environment (Dergotis & Coon, 1993; Lazarus, 1966, 1999; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Monroe & Kelley, 1995; Vingerhoets, 1985). As Lazarus 
(1999) comments, “although interaction is important, the meaning a person constructs 
from relationships with the environment operates at a higher order level of abstraction 
than the concrete variables themselves. Therefore, in addition to interaction, we need 
to speak of transaction and relational meaning” (p. 12). Moreover, Lazarus postulates 
that this relational meaning “is not inherent in the two sets of separate variables. It 
takes the conjoining of both by a mind that considers both the environmental 
conditions and properties of the person in making an appraisal” of a situation (p. 12). 
The essential point here is that the person and environment may interact, but it is 
ultimately the person who appraises what the situation signifies for their personal 
wellbeing.
Lazarus’ work represents a powerful critique of stimulus and response 
approaches. First, by acknowledging the importance of relational meaning and 
interpretation in the stress process we begin to gain an understanding of individual 
differences and of why two individuals may display different emotional responses to 
the same situation (Tomaka et al., 1997). Second, the above analysis finds related 
support in the clinical psychology literature. Of particular significance, cognitive 
therapy and its treatment of psychological dysfunction is also “predicated on the 
premise that particular cognitive processes contribute to maladaptive emotional and 
behavioural responses” (Monroe & Kessler, 1995, p. 127). In summary, stimulus and 
response approaches fall short of providing a full account of the stress process. Even 
if stimulus and response variables interact we still need to understand the role of 
transactional and relational meaning.
2.2 Lazarus and Folkman’s Transactional Model of Stress
As a development of the above critique, one of the most influential models of 
the stress process was proposed by Lazarus and his colleague Folkman in the early 
1980s. The centrepiece of this model is the cognitive process of appraisal. According 
to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), stress is “the particular relationship between the 
person and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his 
or her resources and endangering his or her well-being” (p. 19). Here, then, 
psychological stress only arises when an individual anticipates that he or she will not 
be able to cope with an environmental demand, or failure to meet any demand is 
perceived by the individual as personally significant (Folkman, Chesney, McKusick, 
Ironson, Johnson & Coates, 1991; Kaplan, 1983; Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman,
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1984). Put simply, in order for a situation to be stressful it needs to be perceived as 
such by the individual.
In the 1960s, Lazarus and his colleagues conducted a series of studies to 
demonstrate the role of cognitive appraisal in the stress process (Lazarus, 1966; 
Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus et al., 1965; Speisman et al., 1964). In one of 
their classic studies (Speisman et al., 1964), participants were shown a film that 
depicted a primitive surgical procedure being performed on adolescent males in order 
to create a potentially stressful situation. The participants’ disturbance in affect 
together with their physiological reactions measured by elevated skin conductance 
and heart rate were monitored. The cognitive appraisal was manipulated by 
instmcting participants to interpret the film as either harmful or benign. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Three of the four conditions had 
different soundtracks constmcted to reflect different ways of interpreting the surgical 
procedure while the final condition had no explanatory soundtrack. In the trauma 
condition, the soundtrack emphasised the harmful features associated with the 
procedure -  for example, the pain and mutilation to the body. In the denial condition 
the soundtrack portrayed no harm or pain and even attempted to present the procedure 
in a positive manner. In the intellectualisation condition, the soundtrack presented the 
procedure from an anthropological viewpoint by expressing an interest in strange 
customs without any reference to emotional involvement. The findings indicated that 
participants in the trauma condition were significantly more stressed than individuals 
who viewed the surgical procedure without an accompanying explanatory soundtrack. 
Additionally, participants in the denial and intellectualisation appraisal conditions 
were significantly less stressed than participants in the other conditions. Speisman 
and colleagues (1964) inferred from the findings that different cognitive appraisals
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influence emotional and physiological responses and coping strategies in different 
ways.
A more recent study by Tomaka et al. (1997) also provides support for the 
central role of the cognitive process of appraisal. In their study, participants had to 
perform a mental arithmetic task after hearing one of two instructional sets: a threat 
set emphasising the importance of completing the task as quickly and accurately as 
possible and a challenge set emphasising effort and doing one’s best. The participants 
indicated how threatening they expected the mental arithmetic task to be and their 
physiological reactions (measured by heart rate and blood pressure) were monitored. 
Findings indicated that participants in the threat condition appraised the task as more 
threatening and their physiological reactions were more consistent with a stress 
reaction than participants in the challenge condition. Thus, threat and challenge 
appraisals could be elicited experimentally by manipulating the instructional set.
Within their theoretical approach Lazarus and Folkman (1984) make the 
distinction between two types of cognitive appraisal: primary and secondary 
appraisal. Primary appraisal refers to the evaluation of the situation in terms of its 
significance to the individual’s wellbeing. Thus, it reflects the personal relevance of 
the encounter to the individual. Secondary appraisal refers to the individual’s 
evaluation of the coping resources and options that are available to deal with a 
potential stressor. Hence, secondary appraisal entails the options and prospects for 
coping. Consistent with a transactional account of the stress process, primary and 
secondary cognitive appraisals are not sufficient in their own right to define the 
psychological reaction, it is the combination of these appraisals that determines the 
outcome (Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus & Smith, 1988). More 
specifically, it is the combination of the primary and secondary appraisals in
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interaction with the person and environment that ultimately determines the 
psychological reaction (Lazarus & Smith, 1988). Furthermore, each appraisal is just 
as important as the other and the qualifying label of primary or secondary is not 
intended to connote less importance. The primary appraisal does not necessarily 
come first in the transaction nor does it function independently of the secondary 
appraisal. Thus the difference between these two appraisals is not in the timing or 
importance, it is the content of the appraisal (Lazarus, 1999).
2.2.1 Forms of cognitive appraisal 
Primary appraisal
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) distinguish between three types of primary appraisal and 
psychological stress. Specifically, a primary appraisal may be irrelevant, benign 
positive, or stressful. An irrelevant appraisal occurs when the situation has no 
implications for the person’s wellbeing. The person has nothing invested in the 
possible outcome of the situation and thus they have nothing to lose. On the other 
hand a benign positive appraisal will occur when the outcome of the situation is 
construed as positive and thus the outcome is seen to promise to enhance wellbeing. 
Finally, when a situation is appraised as stressful it poses harm/loss, threat or 
challenge to the individual. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) define harm/loss in terms of 
past experiences that have posed some kind of damage to the individual. These may 
include illness or injury, recognition of some damage to self-esteem or social esteem, 
and the loss of a loved one or valued person. Threat on the other hand, concerns harm 
or losses that have not yet occurred but are anticipated. Here, little if anything is to be 
gained from the situation. Finally, a challenge appraisal focuses on the possibility of 
gain (this may include potential for positive gain, mastery, or growth) as well as loss
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in the situation (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey & Leitten, 
1993).
Secondary appraisal
When a situation is perceived as threatening or challenging something must be done 
to manage it and this is when the secondary appraisal comes into play. Secondary 
appraisal relates to evaluations of what might and can be done to deal with the 
stressful situation at hand. Thus secondary appraisal includes the coping resources 
and options available to the individual. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) conclude, 
“secondary appraisal activity is a crucial feature of every stressful encounter because 
the outcome depends on what, if anything, can be done, as well as on what is at stake” 
(p. 35).
2.2.2 The emotions associated with appraisals
In the process of formulating the transactional account of stress, Lazarus 
began to observe that stress was an aspect of a larger set of issues that included the 
emotions. Subsequently, he expanded the constmct of appraisal to include emotional 
reaction. Lazarus (1991a, 1991b, 1993, 1999) remarks upon the value of studying the 
emotions and the richness this can provide to our understanding of the person’s 
experience. Specifically, he comments: “the information derived by expanding our 
concept of stress to include the emotions is far more revealing about the human 
condition and its clinical implications than the knowledge afforded by the simpler 
stress concept” (p. 23). Thus, according to Lazarus (1993), each emotion tells us 
something different about the conditions faced by the individual and their subjective 
appraisal of the situation. Consequently, the pattern of appraisal differs for each 
emotion and each emotion tells a different story that reflects the person’s evaluation
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of his or her wellbeing. In addition to this, each emotion tells us something about 
how the individual is coping with a situation. It is essential to note that if one wants * 
to change an emotion one must firstly change the cognitive appraisal of the situation.
Lazarus (1999) lists up to fifteen different emotions that are either positive or 
negative in nature that enhance our understanding of the conditions faced by the 
individual and their cognitive appraisal of the situation. These emotions include 
anger, envy, jealousy, anxiety, fright, guilt, shame, relief, hope, sadness, happiness, 
pride, love, gratitude, and compassion. To look at the core themes of a few emotions, 
fright refers to immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger, sadness 
refers to an irrevocable loss, while relief denotes a distressing condition that has 
changed for the better or gone away (Lazarus, 1993).
We will now take a closer look at the emotions associated with a benign 
positive appraisal and the emotions associated with the stress appraisals to illustrate 
how this can increase our understanding of the person’s experience. To reiterate, a 
benign positive appraisal occurs when the situation is construed as positive and there 
is potential for enhancement of wellbeing. The emotions associated with this 
appraisal are pleasurable and may include happiness/joy, pride, gratitude, and love 
(Lazarus, 1993; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The emotions associated with the stress 
appraisals vary depending upon whether the appraisal is one of haim/loss, threat or 
challenge. Harm/loss appraisals consist of damage that has already occurred and are 
associated with emotions of sadness, shame and guilt. On the other hand, threat 
appraisals centre on the potential for harm and are associated with negative emotions 
such as fear, anxiety, and anger. Challenge appraisals focus on the potential for gain 
and growth as well as loss and are more likely to be characterised by positive 
emotions such as eagerness and excitement (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). In general,
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threat appraisals tend to be more strongly associated with negative emotions than 
challenge appraisals. The distinction between threat and challenge appraisals can be 
illustrated by the example of an unprepared student who is likely to feel threatened 
and anxious before an examination compared to a prepared student who is more likely 
to feel challenged and eager to perform. Threat and challenge appraisals are not 
mutually exclusive and often a situation can be appraised as involving both (Lazarus, 
1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Tomaka et al., 1993).
2.3 Coping
Without reference to the coping literature any review of the stress process is 
incomplete. Appraisal and coping processes are closely intertwined and hence, 
coping is a central element of the transactional account (Breznitz & Goldberger, 1993; 
Lazarus, 1999; Moos & Schaefer, 1993). There are three important characteristics to 
consider when defining coping. First, coping is a process that represents the 
individual’s cognitions and behaviours and the changes to these cognitions and 
behaviours as a situation takes place. Second, coping is contextual and refers to how 
the individual thinks or acts within a specific context. Third, coping refers to efforts 
to manage demands without reference to the success of these efforts (Folkman et al., 
1991). Consistent with the above points, Lazarus and Folkman (1984) define coping 
“as constantly changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific external 
and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the 
person” (p. 141). Put simply, coping is the effort to manage psychological stress 
(Lazarus, 1999). Here, then, the implicit prerequisite for coping is the appraisal of an 
event or condition as harmful, threatening or challenging to the individual 
(Eckenrode, 1991).
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Coping serves two main functions: (a) to manage or alter the problem causing 
stress and (b) to regulate the emotional responses to the problem. The former 
function refers to problem-focused coping and the latter function refers to emotion - 
focused coping (Eckenrode, 1991; Folkman et al., 1991; Folkman & Lazarus, 1984; 
Latack, 1986; Terry, Callan & Sartori, 1996, Wethington & Kessler, 1991). Problem- 
focused coping is aimed at gathering information about what to do and implementing 
actions to change the stressful situation while emotion-focused coping regulates the 
emotions tied to the stressful situation (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1999).
Research suggests that different situations call for different coping strategies 
(Wethington & Kessler, 1991). In a community-based study, Lazarus and Folkman 
(1980) analysed the ways in which people coped with the stressful events of daily 
living during the course of one year. Participants provided information about recently 
experienced stressful events on a monthly basis and indicated the coping thoughts and 
actions used in the specific events. The findings indicated that problem-focused 
strategies were relied upon more when the situation was appraised as being amenable 
to change and within the person’s control whereas emotion-focused strategies were 
relied upon more when the situation was appraised as not being amenable to change.
The range of individual cognitions and behaviours that represent either 
problem-focused or emotion-focused coping functions are vast. Folkman, Lazarus, 
Dunkel-Schetter, Delongis and Gruen (1986) conclude that problem-focused and 
emotion-focused functions fall into eight discrete factors. These factors include 
confrontive coping (e g., standing ground and fighting for what you want), planful 
problem solving (e.g., establishing a plan of action and following it), accepting 
responsibility (e.g., realising the problem was brought on by oneself), seeking social
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support (e.g., talking to someone to find out more about the situation), escape- 
avoidance (e.g., hoping a miracle will happen), self-controlling (e.g., keeping one’s 
feelings to oneself), distancing (e.g., trying to forget the whole thing), and positive 
reappraisal (e.g., believing that a situation contributes to one’s personal growth).
Coping research has also examined the coping resources available to the 
individual when implementing problem-focused and emotion-focused coping 
strategies. Coping resources are defined as the characteristics of the person or his or 
her environment that are available for coping (Eckenrode. 1991; Folkman et al., 1991; 
Moos & Schaefer, 1993). These resources for coping may include psychological 
characteristics of the person, such as self-esteem or a sense of mastery, characteristics 
of the person’s environment, such as the social network and availability of social 
support, or achieved statuses such as occupation, education and financial resources 
(Eckenrode, 1991; Folkman etal., 1991).
It is here, within the coping literature that more recent reference has been 
made to the potential for social factors to impact on the stress process. Prior to this, 
researchers tended to focus investigations of appraisal and coping solely on the 
individual and his or her emotional and cognitive processes (Pearlin, 1993). 
Recognition of social factors is seen in references made to the availability of social 
support as a coping resource and in addition, to the seeking of social support, as an 
emotion-focused coping strategy, to reduce the harmful effects of stress (Aspinwall & 
Taylor, 1997; Cohen & Wills, 1985). It is to this important topic that we will now
turn.
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2.4 The provision, receipt and benefits of social support -  a coping 
resource
Over the past two decades, social support has received a considerable amount 
of empirical consideration. In particular, the research literature pays attention to the 
process through which social support has a beneficial effect on wellbeing (Cohen & 
Wills, 1985; Cohen & Syme, 1985). As we will see, the transactions between people 
and their social networks are both a dynamic and complex problem. The workplace 
setting is one example of the many contexts in which the effects of social support 
have been investigated. In this context, studies have explored the role of supervisory 
support, support provided by co-workers and non-work sources of support in 
alleviating or at least ameliorating the effects of workplace stress (Cummins, 1990; 
Ganster, Fusilier & Mayes, 1986; James, 1997; Kaufmann & Beehr, 1986, Terry et 
al., 1996).
Many theorists have proffered different conceptualisations of social support. 
Cobb (1976) conceptualises social support as the belief that one is cared for, esteemed 
and valued. On the other hand Kaplan, Cassel and Gore (1977 cited in Thoits, 1982) 
define support as the degree to which an individual’s basic social needs are met 
through interaction with others. Cohen and Wills (1985) outline four explicit 
functions through which a social support network is thought to have a beneficial 
effect on wellbeing and reduce the harmful effects of stress. Specifically, they 
suggest that social support can have one or more of four basic functions:
(a) emotional, (b) instrumental, (c) informational and (d) social companionship. 
Emotional support involves communication from others about a person’s self-worth 
and acceptance despite any difficulties or personal shortcomings. Instrumental 
support refers to the provision of concrete aid, material resources and financial
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resources. Informational support provides the individual with information to help 
define, increase understanding of, and help cope with stressful events. Finally, social 
companionship relates to the affiliation and time spent with others. Cohen and Wills 
(1985) comment that although support functions can be distinguished conceptually, in 
naturalistic settings they are not usually independent. For example, it is likely that an 
individual who has social companionship will also have access to instrumental 
assistance and emotional support.
The social support literature suggests that there are two distinct processes 
through which social support has an effect on health and wellbeing (Cohen & Syme, 
1985; Gore, 1985; Hobfoll & Vaux, 1993; Kessler & McLeod, 1985; Terry etal.,
1996; Thoits, 1982, Turner, 1981). Cohen and Wills (1985) remark that numerous 
studies have provided evidence of a positive relationship between support and 
wellbeing, and that in theory this could occur through two very different processes. 
One model proposes that social support has a buffering effect on wellbeing. Here it is 
hypothesised that social support exerts its beneficial effects only in the presence of a 
potentially stressful event. On the other hand, the alternative model, termed the main- 
effect model, proposes that social support is beneficial irrespective of whether the 
individual is under stress and thus is important in its own right (Cohen & Syme, 1985; 
Cohen & Wills, 1985; Gore, 1985; Hobfoll & Vaux, 1993, Kessler and McLeod,
1985; Thoits, 1982, Turner 1981; Wilkinson, Walford & Espnes, 2000). Cohen and 
Wills (1985) argue that in fact both models are correct but that each represents a 
different process through which social support can impact upon the stress process. In 
the current research a buffering effect model will be applied, as this is consistent with 
Lazarus and Folkman’s transactional account of the stress process. Here, the implicit 
prerequisite for the provision and receipt of social support is that the individual
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appraises an event as stressful. In this vein, social support may intervene in the stress 
process by either preventing or ameliorating the stress appraisal and accompanying 
negative emotions. For example, informational support may intervene in the stress 
process by helping the individual to either reappraise a stressful situation through 
clarifying his or her understanding and assisting in new interpretations, or by 
providing the individual with suggestions for coping. In this way, reappraisal changes 
how the person-environment relationship is construed.
Several theorists (Cohen & McKay, 1984; Cohen & Syme, 1985, Cohen & 
Wills, 1985; Hobfoll & Vaux, 1993; Turner, 1981) remark upon an important caveat 
to consider when examining the buffering model. This is the importance of 
considering the match between the stressful event and the provision and receipt of 
support. That is, it is reasonable to assume that different stressful events have specific 
salient coping requirements. For example, Hobfoll and Vaux (1993) suggest that 
situations that offer some degree of control and change are best dealt with by 
instrumental and informational support, but also emotional support. On the other 
hand, situations that are not amenable to change are best dealt with by emotional 
support because these situations only allow for the regulation of emotions. Moreover, 
Cohen and Wills (1985) remark that both informational support and emotional 
support are likely to be responsive to a wide range of situations. In contrast, social 
companionship and instrumental support are argued to be effective when “the 
resources they provide are closely linked to the specific need elicited by a stressful 
event” (p. 314).
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2.5 Limitations of transactional models
At this stage, though, both the stress process and the role of social support 
have been conceptualised from what is largely an individualistic perspective. That is, 
the primary unit of psychological analysis has been the individual. Illustrative of this 
point, research into cognitive appraisal in the stress process has focused only on the 
personal relevance of an encounter to an individual, and the way in which this 
influences individual wellbeing. Although the social support literature acknowledges 
the role of social influence and group belonging in the stress process, little 
consideration has been given to how the process of cognitive appraisal is actually 
affected by the social context of salient group memberships in which individuals find 
themselves.
When we look at informational support, the research literature posits that 
information provides the individual with the opportunity to compare their reactions 
with others to help them clarify their understanding of potentially stressful events. 
However, this literature fails to provide an adequate explanation of when this type of 
support is beneficial and who will be seen to be qualified to give it. The benefits of 
informational support in the appraisal of stressful situations have been assumed to 
depend simply on its informational content. In contrast to these assumptions it is 
possible to argue that it is not the informational content per se of support that 
influences the appraisal of stressful events, but the extent to which that content is 
perceived to be valid because it is provided by relevant others in a context of a shared 
understanding of social reality (Turner, 1987, 1991). Subsequently, not all 
information has equal value and its capacity to provide support is dependent upon the 
extent to which the stress sufferer identifies with the support provider (McGarty et al., 
1994).
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All of the above arguments lead us to suggest that the meaning of stress and 
the social interaction that surrounds it is bound up with individuals’ social identities 
(where people see themselves as interchangeable with other members of a relevant 
social category; Turner, 1982) and that this exerts influence on the cognitive appraisal 
process and the provision, receipt and benefits of social support. Furthermore, we 
would also expect that for a situation to be appraised as stressful it must be perceived 
as relevant to one’s personal identity or social identity.
In line with these arguments, this thesis will endeavour to enhance our 
understanding of Lazarus and Folkman’s transactional model of stress by 
understanding the role of social identity salience in the appraisal of stressful 
situations. Specifically, the social psychological dimensions of appraisal and coping 
will be clarified. As Mead (1934, cited in Thoits, 1982) has postulated, social 
identities originate in social interaction and are important aspects of psychological 
wellbeing. Here, then, there is clearly scope for group-based social influence to play 
a key role in the stress process. It is to the social identity approach that we will now 
turn.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Social Identity Approach and Social Influence
The goals of this chapter are twofold. First, to present an outline of the social 
identity approach to issues in social (and, by extension, clinical) psychology and 
second to examine the role of social identity and self-categorization processes in 
social influence. The theoretical and empirical foundations of the social identity 
approach need to be articulated before we can understand its relevance to the stress 
process.
The concept of social identity (Tajfel, 1979; Tajfei & Turner, 1979) was 
developed as part of an attempt to foster an interactionist approach to social 
psychology. This approach is founded upon a critique of individualism. In most 
other approaches to social psychology the primary unit of analysis is the individual 
and the group is seen only as a context in which individual behaviour takes place 
(Turner & Oakes, 1986). Typically, little consideration is given to the view that 
people’s personal attributes and cognitive processes, are in fact, influenced and 
shaped by the groups to which they belong. However, an alternative view holds that 
social psychology is not about individual differences, but socially shared features of 
psychology and interaction. Thus we need to explain human social behaviour in 
terms of the “cognitive and socially shared organization of the [social] system” within 
which people define themselves and interact (Tajfel, 1981, p. 49). The social identity 
approach postulates that the self is comprised of both a personal identity and a social 
identity. The component of the social identity approach that is most pertinent to this 
thesis is self-categorization theory (Turner, 1982, 1987, 1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
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Reicher & Wethereil, 1987; Turner et al., 1994). This theory grew out of social 
identity theory and therefore this chapter will begin with a brief overview of the 
theoretical and empirical foundations of social identity theory. We shall then 
summarise self-categorization theory and the theoretical principles underlying social 
influence that it specifies.
3.1 Social identity theory
The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour (Tajfel, 1979, Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) postulates that the individual and society cannot be dissociated, as they 
are emergent properties of each other (Tajfel, 1979). This theory was originally 
developed to explain the psychological basis of intergroup discrimination Tajfel and 
his colleagues in the 1970s were interested in why group members favour their group 
over other groups and what makes people believe that their group is better than others. 
In an attempt to answer these questions a series of experiments were designed to see 
how little it would take to create discrimination between groups. In what became 
known as the “minimal group studies”, Tajfel and his colleagues assigned participants 
to groups that were designed to be as stripped-down and meaningless as possible 
(Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971). There was no interaction or contact between 
group members, no group goals or history of hostility between groups, and the 
participants were unaware of who was in their group. In addition, participants were 
told that they were assigned to groups on the basis of trivial ad hoc criterion. Here, 
then, the situation was “intergroup” insofar as participants were divided into two 
distinct groups where they were able to perceive themselves as members of one group 
and not the other (Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner, 1996).
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In the initial minimal group studies (Tajfel et al., 1971), schoolboys were 
asked to either estimate the number of dots that flashed on a screen or express 
preferences for a number of abstract paintings by Klee and Kandinsky.
The boys were told that they would be divided into two groups based on how they 
performed on these tasks (in actual fact, the assignment to groups was random). They 
were told which group they were in, but not the membership of other students. After 
this, the boys had to assign points (each signifying a small amount of money) to an 
anonymous member of their group (an ingroup member) and to an anonymous 
member of the other group (an outgroup member) but never to themselves. The 
findings indicated that even these most minimal of intergroup conditions were 
sufficient to produce ingroup-favouring responses. That is, participants awarded more 
points to people who were identified as an ingroup member than to people who were 
identified as an outgroup member, even though there were no personal rewards for 
doing so. In actual fact, participants were primarily concerned with getting more 
points than the outgroup rather than with getting as many points as possible for the 
ingroup. Thus, social categorization was sufficient to produce ingroup favouritism. It 
is interesting to note that Tajfel did not expect intergroup behaviour to occur in this 
highly controlled situation. His idea was to originally establish a baseline of no 
intergroup behaviour and then add variables cumulatively to see at what point 
intergroup discrimination would occur (Turner, 1996).
To test that social categorization produced the ingroup favouritism observed in 
the above findings, Billig and Tajfel (1973) conducted a study that distinguished 
social categorization from similarity between ingroup members. Billig and Tajfel 
(1973) argued that although the assignment to groups was on the basis of performance 
on an arbitrary task, the participants may have assumed that there was some similarity
32
between themselves and other ingroup members, and also that there was some 
difference between themselves and the members of the other group. The procedure 
followed the basic design of the initial minimal group studies. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions: categorization/similarity, 
categorization/non-similarity, non-categorization/similarity and non-categorization/ 
non-similarity. In the categorization/similarity condition participants were divided 
into two groups on the basis of their picture preferences. In the categorization/non­
similarity condition participants were divided into two groups and they were told that 
this had been on the basis of chance. In the non-categorization/similarity condition 
participants were assigned code numbers on the basis of their picture preferences but 
there was no mention of groups. Finally, in the non-categorization/non-similarity 
condition, participants were randomly assigned a code number, there were no explicit 
groups, and code numbers were not assigned on the basis of similarities. Participants 
then had to assign points to one of two people who were (a) either identified or not 
identified as an ingroup and outgroup member and (b) either identified or not 
identified as having similar or different picture preferences. The main finding of this 
study was that the mere mention of ‘group’ was sufficient to produce ingroup- 
favouring responses. That is, participants in the categorization/non-similarity 
condition still allotted more points to members of a random ingroup category and 
discriminated against those assigned to a different random category . Further, their 
ingroup-favouring responses were more pronounced than those of participants in the 
non-categorization/similarity condition in which the notion of group had not been 
explicitly introduced. In sum, the presence or absence of social categorization 
influenced the allocation of points to a greater degree than the presence or absence of 
similarity between participants.
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Taken together, the above studies suggest that the mere act of individuals 
categorizing themselves as a member of a group is sufficient to lead them to display 
ingroup favouritism. One of the most important points that Tajfel (1972) inferred 
from the minimal group studies was that when participants categorized themselves as 
members of a group this also gave their behaviour a distinct meaning. Moreover, “he 
suggested that there was a psychological requirement that groups provide their 
members with a positive social identity and that the positive aspects of social identity 
were inherently comparative in nature, deriving from evaluative comparisons between 
social groups. It followed that to provide positive social identity, groups need to 
distinguish themselves positively from other groups and that intergroup comparisons 
were focused on the maintenance and establishment of positively valued 
distinctiveness for one’s ingroup” (Turner, 1996, p. 16). Along these lines, it can be 
inferred that the need for a positive social identity in the minimal group studies led to 
the observed ingroup-favouring responses. Here, the only available dimension on 
which participants could compare their ingroup with the outgroup was in terms of the 
point allocation and thus to achieve positive distinctiveness for their own group they 
awarded more points or favouring responses to it. These arguments provided the 
basis for a more comprehensive analysis of intergroup behaviour in the form of social 
identity theory.
According to social identity theory, the concept of social identity describes 
“those aspects of a person’s self-concept based upon their group memberships 
together with their emotional evaluative and other psychological correlates (Turner 
and Oakes, 1986, p. 240; see also Tajfel, 1979). Put simply, “social identity is a part 
of a person’s sense of who they are associated with any internalised group 
membership” (Haslam, 2001, p. 31; e.g., a self-definition as “us men” or “we
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Australians”). A central tenet of this theory is that in all social situations, a person’s 
self-concept (and social behaviour) will be defined at some point along an 
interpersonal-intergroup continuum between those in which their personal identity is 
salient (where they see themselves as unique individuals, distinct from all others) and 
those where their social identity is salient (where they see themselves as 
interchangeable with other members of a relevant social category, an ingroup; Turner, 
1982). To reiterate, when personal identity is salient, one is aware of the features that 
distinguish oneself from other individuals and when a social identity is salient one is 
aware of the features that distinguish the ingroup from other comparison outgroups 
(Abrams & Hogg, 1990). At the interpersonal extreme, any social interaction that 
takes place is determined by the personal relationships between individuals and their 
individual characteristics. On the other hand, at the intergroup extreme, all of the 
behaviour of two or more individuals towards each other is determined by their group 
memberships of different social categories or groups (Turner & Haslam, 2001; Turner 
& Onorato, 1999).
A social identity is activated in order to meet the competing demands of 
differentiation of the self from others and inclusion of self into larger social 
collectives. The essential criteria for group membership are that individuals define 
themselves and are defined by others as members of a group (Turner, 1975, 1982). 
One can conceptualise a group “as a collection of individuals who perceive 
themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional 
involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of 
social consensus about evaluation of their group and their membership in it” (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986, p. 15).
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3.1.1 Theoretical assumptions and principles
In brief, the general assumptions of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986) can be seen as threefold. The first is that individuals strive to maintain positive 
self-esteem: that is that they strive for a positive self-concept. The second assumption 
is that “social groups or categories and the membership of them are associated with 
positive and negative value connotations. Hence, social identity may be positive or 
negative according to the evaluations (which tend to be socially consensual, either 
within or across groups) of those that contribute to an individuals’ social identity”
(p. 16). The final assumption is that evaluation of one’s own group is achieved by 
reference to other specific groups, through the process of social comparison. Social 
comparison involves the specific comparison between one’s own beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviours to the beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of others.
From these assumptions Tajfel and Turner (1986) derived three related 
theoretical principles. The first is that individuals strive to achieve or maintain a 
positive social identity. The second is that a positive social identity is based to a large 
extent on favourable comparisons that are between the ingroup and some relevant 
outgroups (groups whose members are seen as unlike the ingroup in a particular 
situation). That is, the ingroup must be perceived as positively distinct from the 
outgroups. This occurs through the process of intergroup differentiation, whereby 
groups attempt to differentiate themselves from each other to achieve relative ingroup 
superiority (Tajfel et al., 1971). For intergroup differentiation to occur, it is essential 
that individuals internalise their aspect of their group membership as an aspect of their 
self-concept, in other words, they must subjectively identify with the relevant ingroup.
The final principle is that when a social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will
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strive to make their existing group more positively distinct or they will leave their 
group in an attempt to join a more positively distinct group.
3.2 Self-categorization theory
Despite the fact that the concept of social identity is central to social identity 
theory, the theory itself does not provide a detailed analysis of the cognitive processes 
associated with social identity salience. Self-categorization theory grew out of the 
research on social categorization and the related concept of social identity, partly to 
address this issue (Turner, 1982, 1987, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). It provides abetter 
understanding of the general principles that govern and predict when people will 
define themselves in terms of a personal or social identity. The theory proposes that 
at different times we perceive ourselves as unique individuals and at other times as 
members of groups and that these are two equally valid and true expressions of self 
(McGarty et al., 1994). For our purpose, it is necessary to note only some major ideas 
of self-categorization theory.
Initially work on self-categorization theory focused on providing an 
explanation of group behaviour and the theoretical implications of social identity 
itself. In particular, Turner (1982) focused on providing a more complete explanation 
of an individual’s movement along Tajfel’s interpersonal-intergroup continuum. As 
mentioned previously, according to Tajfel, a person’s self-concept can be defined at 
some point along a continuum between their personal identity and social identity. 
Turner (1982) postulated that the functioning of the self-concept was the cognitive 
mechanism that produced movement along this continuum. Thus, interpersonal 
behaviour is associated with a salient personal identity and intergroup behaviour is 
associated with a salient social identity. Moreover, Turner (1982) argued that social
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identity is the process that allowed intergroup behaviour to take place. As he put it, 
“the adaptive functioning of social identity.. .is to produce group behaviour and 
attitudes,.. .it is the cognitive mechanism which makes group behaviour possible” 
(Turner, 1984, p. 527). Another important point was the specification of the 
psychological process associated with social identity. Turner referred to this as the 
process of depersonalization, where individuals define and see themselves less in 
terms of unique attributes and individual differences and more as interchangeable 
representatives of some shared social category membership (Turner, 1982, 1984; 
Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al., 1994). For example, when an individual woman 
tends to categorize herself as a woman in contrast to men, she tends to accentuate 
perceptually her similarities to other women and enhance her stereotypical differences 
from men (Hogg & Turner, 1987, Turner et al., 1994). Here the self changes in both 
level and content and self-perception and behaviour becomes depersonalized.
In its present form, self-categorization theory provides an explanation of the 
variation in how people categorize themselves. Of particular significance are the 
conditions under which people categorize themselves more as social groups (in terms 
of social identity) and less as individual persons (in terms of personal identity; Levine 
& Reicher, 1996; Turner & Haslam, 2001; Turner & Onorato, 1999). Self­
categorization theory assumes that cognitive representations of the self take the form 
of self-categorizations. Here the self is seen as a member of a particular class or 
category of stimuli in contrast to some other class or category of stimuli. Further, 
people may define themselves and others at a number of different levels of abstraction 
related by class inclusion (Rosch, 1978). This means that a given self-category is 
seen to be more abstract than another self-category to the extent that it can contain, 
but cannot be contained by the other. For example, all chemists are scientists but not
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all scientists are chemists. The three most important levels of abstraction are: (a) the 
superordinate human level as a human being, (b) the intermediate social level as an 
ingroup member, and (c) the subordinate personal level as a unique individual 
(Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987; Turner et a l., 1994). It is important to note that the 
level of abstraction is a relative concept and therefore any one person will have more 
than one available social category. For instance, the same individual may consider 
herself a psychologist in the lecture theatre, a socialist at the political rally, a sports 
fan at a basketball match and so on. Turner (1985) suggests that as one of these levels 
of self-categorization becomes more salient the other levels should become less 
salient and this is referred to as functional antagonism. Salience refers to the extent to 
which a self-categorization is applied at a particular level. Specifically, McGarty et 
al. (1994) comment that “salience relates not just to the general relevance of group 
membership but refers to selective change in self-perception whereby people actually 
define themselves as unique individuals or members of a group” (p. 287).
What are the specific conditions that determine whether people categorize 
themselves in terms of salient social group memberships or as individual persons? 
The theory explains this variation in how people categorize themselves in terms of an 
interaction between the relative accessibility of a particular self-category (otherwise 
known as the readiness of a perceiver to use a particular self-category) and the fit 
between the category and reality (McGarty et al., 1994; Oakes, 1987; Turner, 1991; 
Turner et al., 1994). Relative accessibility refers to a person’s past experiences, 
present expectations and current motives, goals, needs and values. Moreover, “it 
reflects the active selectivity of the perceiver in being ready to use categories that are 
relevant, useful, and likely to be confirmed by the evidence of reality” (Turner & 
Haslam, 2001, p. 12). One important factor which influences a person’s readiness to
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use a given social category is the extent to which the person identifies with the group 
and the group is both valued and self-involving to the person. To put this another 
way, the effects of social identity salience will be most pronounced when a person 
identifies with an ingroup and internalises that group membership as an aspect of their 
self-concept (Doosje, Ellemers & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1997).
Fit refers to “the degree to which a social category matches subjectively 
relevant features of reality -  so that the category appears to be a sensible way of 
organizing and making sense of social stimuli (i.e., people and things associated with 
them)” (Haslam, 2001, p. 50). Fit has two aspects: comparative and normative fit 
(Oakes, 1987). Comparative fit is defined by the principle of meta-contrast (Turner, 
1991; Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al., 1994). According to this principle, people 
will define themselves in terms of a particular self-category to the extent that the 
difference within that category or given dimension of judgement is seen to be smaller 
than the differences between that category and all other categories that are salient in a 
particular context. Normative fit refers to “the content of the match between category 
specifications and the instances being represented” (Oakes, 1987, Oakes, Haslam & 
Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1994, p. 455). To illustrate, in order to categorize a group 
of students as science students as opposed to arts students, they must not only differ in 
attitudes and actions from science students more than from one another but the nature 
of these attitudes must be consistent with the person’s expectations about the 
categories.
A study reported by Oakes, Turner & Haslam (1991) provides empirical 
support for the importance of fit in determining social category salience. In their 
study, participants watched a video of a group discussion among six students. Three 
of the students were members of the arts faculty and three o f the students were
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members of the science faculty. In the conflict conditions, there was disagreement 
between the arts and science students but agreement within each of these categories.
In the consensus conditions all six students agreed with one another and finally, in the 
deviance conditions one arts student disagreed with the other five students. In half of 
the conditions, a target arts student (and agreeing others) expressed views that were 
consistent with participants’ stereotypes of arts students while in the other half the 
same arts student expressed views that were expected to come from science students. 
The findings indicated that the participants’ social identities as arts or science students 
were most salient in the consistent conflict condition (where there was both 
comparative and normative fit). Moreover, in this condition participants perceptually 
accentuated the similarities within their category and the differences between 
categories and attributed the students’ attitudes to their academic field.
In sum, the categorization process is partially determined by the meta-contrast 
principle. This describes the comparative relations between stimuli, which lead them 
to be represented by a category. But in addition to the meta-contrast principle it is 
important to consider the social meaning of differences between people in terms of 
normative and behavioural content and also the readiness of a perceiver to use a 
particular self-category (Turner & Haslam, 2001; Turner & Onorato, 1999). It is 
essential to emphasise that the way in which people categorize themselves is highly 
variable and context-dependent. For example, biologists and physicists may be 
categorized and perceived as different in a science faculty meeting but be 
recategorized and perceived as similar (e.g., scientists) in a context that encourages 
comparison with social scientists (Turner & Haslam, 2001; Turner et al., 1994).
From the above review, the key points that are pertinent to this thesis are: (a) a 
person’s self-concept may be defined in terms of their unique and individual
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characteristics (their personal identity) and at other times in terms of their social 
group memberships (their social identity), (b) our personal and social identities are 
both tme and valid expression of the self, (c) when a social identity becomes salient 
people tend to perceive themselves less in terms of their personal differences and 
individuality and more in terms of attributes that define them as members of an 
ingroup, (d) depersonalization of self-perception produces group behaviour and, 
finally (e) the effects of social identity salience will be most pronounced when a 
person identifies with an ingroup and internalises that group as an aspect of their self- 
concept.
Self-categorization theory has been applied to many processes in social 
psychology. Some of these processes have included social judgement, crowd 
behaviour, small group processes and social stereotyping. But arguably the most 
extensive application to date has been in its explanation of social influence. It is to 
this topic that we now turn.
3.3 Social influence and self-categorization
Social influence refers to the process through which people shape and change 
the behaviour and attitudes of others (Haslam, 2001). Typically, the role of influence 
in social psychology has been explained in terms of a distinction between 
informational and normative influence. Normative influence is conformity to the 
positive expectations of self and others. Alternatively, informational influence refers 
to the acceptance of information obtained from others as evidence about reality. This 
distinction was explicitly stated by Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) dual process model 
and was anticipated by social comparison theory (after Festinger, 1954). Specifically, 
according to Festinger’s social comparison model, in order to test the validity of our
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opinions we need to compare them against reality. There are two kinds of reality 
testing, the first is referred to as physical reality testing and the second is referred to 
as social reality testing. The physical mode of testing reality involves the direct use of 
one’s own perceptual, cognitive and behavioural capacities without resorting to the 
opinions of others to evaluate a belief. On the other hand, when they engage in the 
social mode of reality testing individuals compare their views with similar others in 
order to evaluate a belief. Festinger argues that people turn to others who they see as 
similar in order to gain information (social reality testing) only when objective and 
non-social information (physical reality testing) is not available. Essentially, 
individual perception is seen as primary and valid whereas social influence is 
secondary, unreliable and only used as an extension of individual perception. Hence, 
individuals are assumed only to influence others by virtue of the asocial valid 
information that they possess and as a result informational influence is seen as an 
individual cognitive process. To put this another way, this model implies that people 
are primarily influenced by the validity of the information obtained by others and that 
normative influence -  based on group memberships -  is a secondary, unreliable 
process. However, more recently, self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987, 1991; 
Turner et al., 1994) has questioned whether physical reality testing exists in isolation 
from social reality testing and whether social reality testing really is secondary or 
optional.
Self-categorization theory postulates that the very possibility of influence is 
dependent upon the shared social categorical nature of the self (salient social 
identities). Moreover, it suggests that it is the shared social identity between self and 
ingroup members which leads people to tend to agree and also expect to agree in their
reactions to the same stimulus situation. Therefore, it is not the informational content
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per se of others that influences how we appraise situations, but the extent to which 
that content is validated by social psychological means -  with relevant others in a 
context of a shared reality (McGarty et al., 1994; Platow, Mills & Morrison, 2000; 
Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1994). As McGarty et al. put it “there is an interplay 
between how we view other people and what we think, in that the way we interact 
with other people, and the impact they have on us, varies as a consequence of the 
group memberships we perceive them to have” (1994, p. 270). Here physical and 
social reality testing are not alternate bases of validity, rather they represent two 
interdependent phases of a single process that involves both direct reality testing and 
consensual validation by similar others (Turner, 1991). Thus, the social context is 
important not only because it affects the information to which people are exposed but 
also because it determines how the information is construed. We are more likely to be 
persuaded by others and accept them as legitimate sources of influence, capable of 
informing and validating our cognitions, when we categorize them as similar to self 
(as ingroup members). This is less likely to be the case when we categorize the 
source as different to self (an outgroup member). Furthermore, the same information 
may be accepted or rejected, as different social identities become salient in different 
contexts and this is a function of context-dependent categorization.
A study by McGarty et al. (1994) demonstrates that the acceptance of a 
persuasive message is dependent upon whether the speaker is categorized as similar to 
self (an ingroup member). In their study, participants were presented with a 
persuasive message that was attributed to either an ingroup or outgroup speaker. 
Before the participants were exposed to the message they were asked to express their 
acceptance or rejection of the stance of the speaker’s group, who either wanted to 
improve road safety or outlaw the sale and consumption of alcohol (thus group
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membership was made salient by making the participants identify and commit to the 
group). The findings indicated that when group memberships were made salient a 
message from the outgroup was less persuasive than one from an ingroup. That is, 
participants were more likely to agree with the message when it came from an ingroup 
source as opposed to an outgroup source when they were committed to their group 
(conditions of high salience). In addition, participants accurately recalled more 
arguments from an ingroup source than an outgroup source under conditions of high 
salience. McGarty and colleagues (1994) inferred from these findings that the 
persuasiveness of a message is a function of the extent to which it reflects a social 
(ingroup) consensus. Furthermore “to the extent that self-perception is located at a 
social categorical level (i.e., people currently perceive themselves to be 
interchangeable with other ingroup members) perceivers will be more persuaded by 
relevant ingroup than by outgroup members” (McGarty et al., 1994, p. 290). That is, 
it is the shared social identity between self and others that leads people to agree and 
expect to agree in their reactions to a situation (see also Haslam, Turner, Oakes, 
McGarty & Reynolds, 1998).
Another study by Mackie, Asuncion & Worth (1990) also demonstrates that 
the acceptance of a message is dependent upon whether the source is perceived as 
qualified to inform the individual about reality. In their study, participants either read 
or listened to a strong or weak message from a student from their university (an 
ingroup member) or a student from another university (an outgroup member). 
Findings indicated that the participants were more persuaded by a strong message 
than a weak one from an ingroup member. But they were equally unpersuaded by a 
strong or weak message from an outgroup member. Here, then, a poor message from 
an ingroup member may not necessarily be seen as a good one but it is still more
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persuasive than the same message from an outgroup member. Mackie and colleagues 
concluded “that what makes information strong, valid, relevant, and worthy of further 
attention depends upon the social context” (p. 821).
3.4 Summary
Having reviewed the social identity approach and its explanation of social 
influence we are now at the stage where it is possible to bring the social identity 
approach to bear upon an examination of the stress process. To summarise from the 
above review, a person’s self-concept is comprised of both a personal identity and a 
social identity and these are both true and valid expressions of self. When a social 
identity becomes salient people tend to perceive themselves less in terms of their 
personal differences and more in terms of attributes that define them as members of 
an ingroup. Here the self changes in both level and content and self-perception and 
behaviour becomes depersonalized. Moreover, the effects of social identity salience 
will be most pronounced when a person identifies with an ingroup and internalises 
that group as an aspect of their self-concept. It is also important to reiterate that the 
way in which people categorize themselves is highly variable and context-dependent. 
Self-categorization theory provides a detailed analysis of social identity salience and 
some of the extensive empirical support for this view has been presented in this 
chapter.
The following chapter will present an integrated model that has the potential to 
enrich our understanding of stress at two different stages of the transactional process. 
In brief, we can assert that a situation will be appraised as stressful when it is relevant 
and meaningful not only to an individual’s personal identity but also to their social 
identity. Specifically, the relevance of a stressor to an individual’s personal or social
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identity is dependent on the context and how the self is defined in a given context. In 
the previous chapter outlining the stress process, the research literature only considers 
the impact of a stressor from what is largely an individual perspective. The primary 
unit of psychological analysis is the individual. The social identity approach 
considers how the process of cognitive appraisal is actually influenced by the social 
context of salient social group memberships in which individuals find themselves. In 
addition, the role of social identity and self-categorization processes in social 
influence can provide an important explanation of when informational support will be 
beneficial and who will be qualified to give it. Within the stress literature, the 
benefits of informational support in the appraisal of stressful situations has been 
assumed to depend simply on its informational content. However, from a social 
identity and self-categorization perspective, social support in the form of 
informational support is not dependent upon the informational content per se of 
others. It is dependent upon the extent to which that content is provided to the stress 
sufferer by a person who is seen as qualified to inform him or her about reality (an 
ingroup member). The following chapter provides a more parsimonious account of 
social cognitive factors in the stress process by explaining the underlying process 
from a social identity and social influence perspective.
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CHAPTER FOUR
An Integrated Model: Enhancing our Understanding of the 
Stress Process by Understanding the Role of Social Identity
in Social Influence
In this chapter, the social identity approach and the role of self-categorization 
processes in social influence will be brought to bear upon an explanation of the stress 
process. In particular, the social psychological dimensions of appraisal and coping 
will be clarified. As a first step in this direction, the contribution of some formative 
work explonng the role of social identity and social influence in the stress process 
will be considered. This chapter will start, though, with a brief recapitulation of both 
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress and self-categorization 
theory. To facilitate the integration of these approaches we will focus on those 
aspects of both theoretical frameworks that are pertinent to the current research.
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress is predicated on 
an assumption that psychological stress arises from a relationship between the 
individual and the environment, where a cognitive appraisal intervenes between the 
environment and the subsequent experience of stress. This relationship is considered 
to be both dynamic and reciprocal. Thus, the characteristics of the relationship can 
change over time and circumstance and, in addition, the environment is seen to affect 
the person and the person is seen to have the capacity to influence the environment. 
Importance is given to the relational meaning and interpretation that a person 
constructs from their interaction with the environment. The essential point here is that 
psychological stress arises when individuals anticipate that they will not be able to
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cope with a situation that they define as personally significant. Put simply, a situation 
will be perceived as stressful when it is perceived as such by the individual.
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) make the distinction between two types of 
cognitive appraisal: primary and secondary appraisal. Primary appraisal involves 
evaluating the significance of a situation or event in terms of the individual’s 
wellbeing. Secondary appraisal concerns the individual’s evaluation of the coping 
resources and options available to deal with potentially stressful situations. There are 
three types of primary appraisal and psychological stress. In particular, primary 
appraisal may view a potential stressor as irrelevant, benign positive or stressful.
When a situation is appraised as stressful it involves harm, threat or challenge to the 
individual (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Tomaka et al., 1993). The current research 
mainly addresses the impact of irrelevant and threat appraisals. When a situation 
carries no implications for the individual’s wellbeing, it is appraised as being 
irrelevant. Here the individual does not lose or gain anything from the interaction 
between themselves and the environment. In contrast, threat appraisals arise where 
harm or loss have not yet occurred but are anticipated and little if anything is to be 
gained from the situation. Some of the negative emotions associated with threat 
appraisals include fear, anger, and anxiety (Lazarus, 1993, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984).
Appraisal and coping processes are closely linked and coping is a central 
component of the transactional model (Breznitz & Goldberger, 1993; Lazarus, 1999; 
Moos & Schaefer, 1993). In essence, coping is defined as the effort to manage 
psychological stress (and the implicit prerequisite is the appraisal of a situation as 
harmful, threatening or challenging). Acknowledgement of the capacity for social 
factors to impact on the stress process is central to the coping literature. These factors
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indicate the seeking of social support as a coping strategy and to the availability of 
social support as a coping resource (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Cohen & Wills, 1985; 
Pearlin, 1993). Following Cohen and Wills (1985) social support can provide the 
individual with (a) a sense of self-acceptance and self-worth (emotional support),
(b) social companionship, (c) information that is useful in understanding and coping 
with stressful events (informational support), and finally (d) concrete aid, material 
resources, and financial assistance (instrumental support). Several theorists assert that 
it is important to match the support to the type of stressor. Hence, different situations 
require different coping resources and strategies (Hobfoll & Vaux, 1993; Cohen & 
Wills, 1985; Cohen & McKay, 1984; Turner, 1981).
Consistent with Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional account of the 
stress process, it is hypothesised that social support intervenes in the stress process 
only in the presence of potentially stressful situations by preventing or ameliorating 
the stress appraisal and accompanying negative emotions (the buffering effect model). 
Focusing on informational support, the individual is provided with the opportunity to 
compare their reactions with others and this assists in the reappraisal of stressful 
situations by increasing one’s understanding of the situation and also indicating the 
appropriateness of one’s emotional reactions. In other words, the exchange of 
information within the social network enables the person to acquire new 
interpretations and to clarify their understanding of potentially stressful situations.
This point in turn suggests that the social context in which individuals find 
themselves, in particular, their location within a society of interacting groups (some of 
which they belong to) may exert influence over their stress response. In this vein, 
there is clearly potential for a better understanding of the role of group -based social
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influence in the stress process. Moreover, it is possible that the meaning of stress and 
the social interactions that surrounds it is bound up with individuals’ social identities.
Although the social support literature takes into account the role of group 
belonging and social influence in the stress process, its perspective is still inherently 
individualistic. That is to say, the primary unit of analysis is the individual acting as 
an individual. In the following section we will see that social comparison theory 
(after Festinger, 1954) has typically been applied to the social support literature. 
However, it fails to provide an adequate explanation of the role of the social context 
in the appraisal of stressful situations and events. Moreover, this model assumes that 
individuals influence others simply by means of the information that they possess and 
as a result informational support is seen as an individual cognitive process. 
Additionally, little consideration is given to how the stress process is influenced by 
relevant others in a context of a shared social reality. In contrast to this view, we 
argue that it is possible to examine how a stressor affects the individual at both the 
individual and social level of analysis. A person’s self concept is comprised of both a 
personal identity and social identity and hence, a stressor may be relevant or irrelevant 
to self depending upon the context and whether the individual’s personal identity or 
social identity is salient in that context (i.e., “I” and “me” or “we” and “us”). Thus 
social identity salience can play a role in the appraisal of stressful situations or events. 
In this respect, the purpose of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of 
psychological stress by understanding the role of social identity salience in the 
cognitive appraisal process. The principles of self-categorization theory are of 
particular relevance to our understanding of stress appraisals and in addition, the 
provision, receipt and benefits of social support.
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As noted previously, self-categorization theory asserts that one aspect of the 
self is the cognitive aspect, and this is the system that determines how people 
categorize themselves. Further, cognitive representations of self take the form of self­
categorizations (Turner, 1987, 1991). In simple terms, self-categorization theory 
postulates that a person's self-concept includes both their personal identity and social 
identities (although the theoiy acknowledges the possibility of more than two levels of 
identity). Thus, at different times we categorize ourselves as unique individuals and 
at other times as members of groups and these are both equally valid expressions of 
self. When individuals define themselves less in terms of their unique characteristics 
and attributes and more as interchangeable representatives of some shared social 
category membership (a salient social identity) there is a change in the level and 
content of self and self-perception and behaviour becomes depersonalized (Turner, 
1982). This change in self-perception and behaviour is the cognitive mechanism that 
allows intergroup behaviour to take place (Turner, 1982, 1984, 1991; Turner et ah, 
1987).
The conditions that determine whether people categorize themselves as 
individual persons or in terms of salient social group memberships are quite complex. 
Moreover, it is essential to emphasise that the way in which people categorize 
themselves is highly variable and context-dependent. In the previous chapter it was 
illustrated that the way in which people categorize themselves is determined by the 
combination of their readiness to use a particular self-category and the fit between 
that category and reality (McGarty et ah, 1994, Oakes, 1987; Turner, 1991; Turner et 
ah, 1994). Fit describes the degree to which a social category matches subjectively 
relevant features of reality -  so that the category appears to be organised and makes 
sense of social stimuli in a reasonable way (this includes both normative and
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comparative fit; Haslam, 2001; Oakes, 1987). For our purpose it is important to keep 
in mind that the extent to which a person identifies with a particular social group is 
dependent upon their readiness to use that social category. Further, when a person 
identifies with a social group and internalises that group as an aspect of their self- 
concept, the effects of social identity salience will be most pronounced (Ellemers et 
al., 1997).
Self-categorization theory posits that our interaction with other people varies 
as a consequence of our perceived group memberships. Furthermore, the way in 
which people shape and change our behaviour and attitudes is dependent upon the 
shared categorical nature of self. That is, people are more likely to accept others as 
legitimate sources of influence, capable of informing and validating their cognitions, 
when they are categorized as similar to self. The social context is also important 
because it affects both the information a person is exposed to and the meaning and 
interpretation a person assigns to this information (McGarty et al., 1994; Turner,
1991; Turner etal., 1994).
4.1 A critique of the application of social comparison theory to the 
stress process
As noted previously, the idea that social factors play a role in the stress 
process has typically been explored using Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory 
as a framework for examining coping processes (Bunnk, 1994; Gump & Kulik, 1997; 
Kulik, Mahler & Moore, 1996). Social comparison theory postulates that people are 
motivated to validate their own opinions and accurately know their own abilities. 
Festinger argued that we prefer to evaluate our abilities and opinions using objective 
and non-social methods (physical reality testing), but when this objective information
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is not available we will turn to others who we see as similar to self in order to evaluate 
ourselves and gain this information (i.e., engaging in social reality testing). Here, 
then, individual perception is seen as primary and valid whereas social influence is 
seen as “secondary, unreliable, indirect, abnormal and coercive and is only used in 
default and in so far as it functions as an extension of individual perception” (Turner, 
1987, p. 70).
Although Festinger did not explicitly relate social comparison processes to 
stress, it is clear that these processes can be related to our understanding of coping 
with stress, as in such situations the need for self-evaluation is often quite prominent. 
Schächter (1959) explicitly established the link between social comparison theory and 
stress when he expanded social comparison to the domain of threat and emotion. 
According to Schächter (1959), the uncertainty generated by threatening and novel 
situations increases a person’s desire to affiliate with others, particularly with others 
who are facing a similar situation to themselves. As he suggested, people are 
motivated to affiliate with similarly-threatened others because such individuals are 
thought to provide the best means of evaluating the “intensity, nature, or 
appropriateness of one’s emotional state” (Gump & Kulik, 1997, p. 305). Moreover, 
by talking with or simply observing others in similar circumstances and comparing 
their emotional responses with our own, we are able to test out our initial 
interpretations and/or plans for dealing with potentially stressful situations or events.
In line with this argument, a number of studies have demonstrated that when 
placed in novel and threatening situations, individuals are more likely to affiliate with 
those who share a similar fate (Gerard & Rabbie, 1961; Gump & Kulik, 1997; Kulik 
et al., 1996; Schächter, 1959). For example, a study by Gerard and Rabbie (1961) 
demonstrated that when individuals were made fearful by the threat of an impending
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electric shock they generally preferred to wait with someone also facing the 
impending threat (of similar emotional status) than on their own. When individuals 
were provided with information about the intensity of their emotional 
reactions and the emotional reactions experienced by others this reduced their desire 
to affiliate. Gerard and Rabbie (1961) inferred from these findings that threat 
increases the need for affiliation. However, this desire to affiliate with others facing a 
similar fate is reduced when individuals are provided with information that allows 
them to determine the appropriateness of their emotional reactions.
Another interesting aspect of Schachter’s extension of social comparison 
theory concerns how a person’s emotional reactions to a situation are actually 
influenced by others. According to Schächter (1959), affiliation produces pressure to 
establish a common social reality so that, if people encounter discrepant emotional 
reactions to a threatening situation, they will attempt to influence each others ’ 
emotional reactions to bring them closer to their own position -  to develop a 
consensual view of the world. To put this another way, the social comparison model 
of contagion predicts that a person’s emotional responses to a situation will be 
influenced by another individual’s emotional state when one is under threat and faces 
a similar situation, rather than, dissimilar situation to that of the other person. Here, 
both verbal and non-verbal forms of affiliation with similar others provide the 
opportunity to increase one’s understanding of the situation and to establish whether 
one’s emotional responses are appropriate. This information is believed to influence 
others’ appraisal of the stressful situation and their emotional reactions, producing 
consensus through a form of emotional contagion (Gump & Kulik, 1997).
Under this model, it is assumed that the persuasiveness of a message is dependent 
only on the information provided. When people are uncertain about potentially
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stressful events or situations, the information provided by the social network 
(regardless of the source) is thought to enable the person to clarify their understanding 
of the situation, and guide their emotional responses (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997). In 
general, this theory of informational influence asserts that uncertainty arises from the 
objective ambiguity of a situation and that individuals rely on others for information 
to reduce this uncertainty. Here people will be influenced only if the information is 
provided by others perceived to give valid evidence about reality (Turner, 1987). In 
this respect, individuals are only expected to influence others by virtue of the (asocial) 
valid information they possess and the impact of social support in the appraisal of 
stressful situations has been assumed to depend simply on the informational content. 
In other words, informational support is seen as simply the acceptance of information 
obtained from others as evidence about reality. As a result, informational support is 
seen as an individual cognitive process. This suggests that people are primarily 
influenced by the validity of the informational content and that normative influence -  
based on social group memberships -  is a secondary, inferior and unreliable process 
(Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
In summary, within the stress literature, the influence of social support in the 
appraisal of stressful situations has been assumed to depend only on the informational 
content of stress-related signs and messages. In contrast to these assumptions, self­
categorization theory’s explanation of social influence suggests it is doubtful that 
physical reality testing exists in isolation from social reality testing. Nor is social 
reality testing secondary and optional. As Turner (1991) puts it, “rather than thinking 
of two alternative bases of validity, the physical versus the social, we should think of 
one basis with two interdependent phases, the phase of direct individual testing of 
reality and the phase of consensual validation by others” (p. 1 53). Self-categorization
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theory argues that the very possibility of influence is dependent upon the shared 
categorical nature of self (our salient social identities). Further, it is the shared social 
identity between self and other relevant ingroup members which leads people to agree 
and also expect to agree (Haslam et ah, 1998, McGarty et al, 1994). This point in 
turn suggests that it is not the informational content per se that influences how we 
appraise stressful situations, but the extent to which the content is validated by social 
psychological means -  with relevant others in a context of a shared reality (McGarty 
et al., 1994; Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1994).
On the above basis, we assert that informational support should influence 
cognitive appraisal only when it is provided to the stress sufferer by a person who is 
seen to be qualified to inform them about social reality, because that person is seen to 
be an ingroup member. In addition to this, is it possible to suggest that the validity of 
information is socially mediated and depends on the message content in interaction 
with the message source (Jacobs & Haslam, 2000). The essential point here is that the 
validity of information is partly determined by the perceiver’s belief that information 
emanates from a relevant ingroup, whose members are qualified to inform him or her 
about social reality by virtue of their social categorical interchangeability with the 
perceiver. This is much less likely to be the case when we categorize the source as 
different to self (an outgroup member). In preliminary research, Jacobs and Haslam 
(2000) obtained some support for this analysis. In their study, participants waiting to 
participate in a mental arithmetic task were exposed to a message in which the testing 
situation was described as stressful or challenging. The message was delivered by the 
same person in each condition but this person was said to be either an ingroup 
member (a university student) or an outgroup member (a stress disorder sufferer). 
Based on self-categorization theory, the primary prediction was that participants
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would appraise the testing situation as less stressful when a fellow student informed 
them that it was challenging rather than stressful. But the same message from the 
stress suffer was expected to have less impact on the participants’ perceptions, and 
play a negligible role in ameliorating stress. Consistent with their predictions, when 
participants were informed by an ingroup member that a testing situation was 
challenging, as opposed to stressful, they perceived the situation as less stressful. 
However, the same effect was not apparent when participants were informed about 
the testing situation by a person they believed was an outgroup member. This 
provides formative support for the argument that the benefits of informational support 
are dependent upon the extent to which the stress sufferer identifies with the source.
4.2 Social identity and the stress response
The above critique suggests that although the stress literature carefully 
identifies the potential for social factors to impact upon the stress process, using social 
comparison theory as a framework for examining this possibility is too limited. For 
within social comparison theory the group is only seen as a context in which 
individual behaviour takes place rather than being an important determinant of the 
stress process. As a result, it is suggested that more attention needs to be paid to the 
impact of social identity salience in the cognitive appraisal process.
Work by James (1995, 1997) attempts to fill some of the gaps in existing 
knowledge of stress processes and social identity. In particular, social identity is 
proposed to exert a major influence on health-related outcomes for minority workers 
(African American) in majority-dominated organisations (European American). As 
James (1997) comments, “social identity is proposed to exert a major influence on 
both behaviour directed toward minority workers by non-minority colleagues that can
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be stressors and on minority individuals’ own perceptions of stress and their ability to 
cope with it” (p. 127). He also states that “because group memberships contribute 
substantially to identity and esteem, they are capable of influencing virtually all types 
of behaviors, cognitions, and emotions” (p. 128).
James (1995, 1997) asserts that the levels of social support minority workers 
receive from their colleagues may be the result of race-based social identities. Along 
lines suggested by social identity theory (Tajfel, 1979, Tajfel & Turner, 1979), James 
(1995, 1997) suggests that categorizing minority workers as outgroup members tends 
to increase perceptions of differences in values and social norms between them and 
the relevant ingroup. Moreover, the need to maintain a positive social identity and the 
extent to which favourable comparisons are made between the ingroup (European 
American) and relevant outgroup (African American) to achieve ingroup superiority, 
tends to promote discomfort and avoidance of interactions with outgroup members 
(Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For this reason, he argues that minority 
workers employed in mainly non-minority organisations may tend to receive 
relatively low levels of social support on the job.
The two major categories of social support at work that have been examined in 
previous research are support from coworkers and support from supervisors 
(Cummins, 1990; Ganster et al., 1986; Kaufmann & Beehr, 1986; Terry et al., 1996). 
Social support on the job has been shown to exert influence on the negative effects of 
work stressors when they arise, by reducing or alleviating their negative effects (see 
Cohen & Wills, 1985, for a review). Because of the effects of social identity on 
ingroup-outgroup relations, James (1995, 1997) asserts that minority workers may not 
obtain sufficient social support from either a non-minority supervisor or from a non­
minority coworker. As he notes, “intergroup tensions can also inhibit minority
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individuals’ willingness to seek support from majority coworkers, as well as their 
willingness to accept such support should it be offered” (James, 1995, p. 110). 
Moreover, there are differences in the quality of support received and “in the 
effectiveness of the support depending on the relationships of the parties (e.g. whether 
or not they are from a common ingroup)” (James, 1995, p. 110).
In one study, James (1995) examined the level of perceived support on the job 
and health-related outcomes to an American organisation, such as days missed from 
work due to illness, between minority (African Americans) and majority workers 
(European Americans). Education and other socioeconomic factors were held 
constant. The findings indicated that minority workers reported lower levels of social 
support at work than the majority workers. In addition, social support was a 
significant predictor of health outcomes for majority workers. In particular, for 
majority workers social support on the job was associated with fewer behaviours that 
reflected health costs to the organisation. However, social support was not related to 
health outcomes among minority workers. The study provided support for some of 
the basic principles articulated by social identity theory and its explanation of what 
leads to different identity-related health outcomes in the workplace.
Having said that, though, it is notable that the above theoretical framework 
fails to present either (a) an adequate explanation of the stress process or (b) a detailed 
analysis of social identity salience and its influence in the stress process. Although 
James claims to integrate stress and social identity theory, no theoretical 
conceptualisation of stress is provided. James fails to acknowledge the cognitive 
appraisal process and the evaluation of the relational meaning and interpretation the 
person assigns from their interaction with the environment. Additionally, only a 
global measure of social support was assessed, and the different types of social
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support that have been referred to in the stress literature were not taken into account. 
Further, no importance was assigned to matching the support to the type of stressor 
(Cohen & McKay, 1984, Cohen & Syme, 1985; Cohen & Wills, 1985; Hobfoll & 
Vaux, 1993; Turner, 1981).
A more detailed analysis of the cognitive processes associated with social 
identity salience would also provide a better understanding of when workplace 
stressors will be appraised as relevant or irrelevant to the self. James’ use of social 
identity theory does not provide this detailed analysis. As demonstrated in the 
foregoing chapters, self-categorization theory provides a better understanding of the 
general principles that govern and predict when people will define themselves in 
terms of a personal identity or available social category. Self-categorization theory 
can also provide an account of why the effectiveness of social support depends upon 
whether the provider is an ingroup member. The theory explains that the very 
possibility7 of influence (or support) is dependent upon the shared categorical nature of 
self. The work by James (1995, 1997) also fails to provide an explanation of the 
underlying social psychological processes associated with the provision, receipt and 
benefits of social support. Finally, James (1995, 1997) does not highlight the variable 
and context-dependent nature of stress and self-categorization processes.
4.3 The current theoretical model: Enhancing our understanding of the 
stress process by understanding the role of social identity and 
social influence
From the arguments outlined thus far, one important point emerges -  the need 
to clarify the role of social identity salience and social influence in the cognitive 
appraisal of (and the individual’s ability to cope with) potentially stressful situations.
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In this section we will present an integrated model which has the potential to enhance 
our understanding of the cognitive appraisal of stress by considering how the 
appraisal process is actually affected by the social context. We will attempt to 
demonstrate that self-categorization theory can provide a more parsimonious account 
of stress at two different stages of the transactional process. The social psychological 
dimensions of both cognitive appraisal and coping will be articulated.
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress and self-categorization 
theory (Turner, 1987, 1991, Turner et al., 1987) are two very different models that 
provide an account of two distinct psychological processes. Therefore, one might ask 
how social identity salience and social influence relate to the transactional stress 
equation? The possibility of integration rests upon the following assumptions. First, 
both theoretical models provide an account of a psychological process. Second, 
cognitive appraisal, coping and self-categorization processes are both dynamic and 
variable. Specifically, the interaction between the person and the environment in the 
transactional stress equation and the conditions that determine whether people define 
themselves in terms of a personal identity or social identity can change over time and 
circumstance. This leads to the final assumption that cognitive appraisal, coping and 
self-categorization processes are context-dependent.
The current theoretical framework replaces Lazarus and Folkman’s traditional 
conceptualisation of stress by hypothesising that stress is a particular relationship 
between the person and the environment that is appraised as taxing or exceeding his 
or her resources and endangering his or her self-concept, which includes both one’s 
personal identity and social identities. Here, then, the cognitive appraisal process has 
been augmented to also include social wellbeing. At present, Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984) conclude that a situation will be appraised as stressful only when it is relevant
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and meaningful to the individual’s wellbeing. In addition to this, they define coping 
as the continually changing behavioural and cognitive efforts to manage either 
external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the 
resources of the individual. However, following principles from the social identity 
approach, a more comprehensive definition of coping incorporates the self-concept. 
Thus, coping is defined as the continually changing cognitive and behavioural efforts 
to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as exceeding 
the resources of the individual and endangering his or her self-concept.
The empirical chapters will examine the potential of social identity salience at 
two different stages of the stress process. First, it is suggested that social identity 
principles can help to further our understanding of why a potentially stressful situation 
is appraised as relevant or irrelevant to the individual. According to Lazarus and 
Folkman (1984) the primary appraisal refers to the evaluation of the situation in terms 
of its significance to the individual’s wellbeing. Here, then, the primary appraisal 
only reflects the personal relevance of an encounter to the individual’s wellbeing. 
Lazarus and Folkman fail to take account of the fact that our cognitive processes, 
emotions and personal attributes, are influenced and shaped by the groups to which 
we belong. Moreover, it is important to explain human behaviour in terms of the 
cognitive and socially shared features of the social context within which people 
interact and define themselves (Tajfel, 1981). Therefore, from a social identity 
perspective, primary appraisal refers to the evaluation of the situation in terms of its 
significance to the person’s self-concept, which may be comprised of both a personal 
identity and social identity. The primary appraisal reflects the relevance and 
importance of an encounter to one’s personal identity or social identity. In this vein, 
it is hypothesised that the impact of a stressor will vary as a function of its perceived
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relevance and importance to self. It also follows that interruption of any process not 
relevant to the self should not result in a stress appraisal. In addition, it is essential to 
emphasise that a situation will be appraised as relevant or irrelevant to the self 
depending upon the context and how the self is defined in a given context. This is 
consistent with the dynamic, variable and context-dependent nature of stress and self­
categorization processes.
Secondly, self-categorization theory and its specification of the theoretical 
principles underlying social influence (McGarty et al., 1994; Turner, 1987, 1991) can 
provide a more accurate account of the provision, receipt and benefits of 
informational support. The main ideas are as follows. When a situation is appraised 
as potentially stressful something must be done to manage it and this is when the 
secondary appraisal comes into play. Secondary appraisal includes the assessment of 
the coping resources and options available to the individual to deal with the 
potentially stressful situation at hand (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). One particular 
coping resource, in the form of social support, can have a beneficial effect on the 
individual’s self-concept (depending upon the context and how the self is defined in a 
given context). Specifically, we propose that informational support should influence 
the cognitive appraisal process and accompanying stress reaction, when it is provided 
to the appraiser by a person who is seen to be qualified to inform him or her about 
social reality (an ingroup member). According to this view, informational support is 
socially mediated and depends upon the message content in interaction with the 
message source. In other words, the provision, receipt and benefits of informational 
support should be evident when the source and the appraiser share the same social 
identification (and accompanying perspective) in the context in which information is 
provided. Furthermore, as different identities become salient in different contexts, the
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way in which people appraise and cope with the very same information will change 
(Jacobs & Haslam, 2000; Levine & Reicher, 1986).
Accordingly, if a stressor is relevant to a person’s social identity and they 
receive informational support from an ingroup member about a testing situation, their 
stress response should decrease when subjected to the same testing situation again. 
However, the same pattem should not apply when a stressor is relevant to a person’s 
personal identity and they are exposed to informational support provided by another 
individual. This argument is derived from the premise that the benefits of 
informational support are dependent upon the extent to which the stress sufferer 
identifies with the provider and perceives him or her as an ingroup member (in a 
context of a shared social reality). Figure 4.1 provides a schematic summary of this 
integrated model.
Taken together, the above arguments provide a theoretical framework that 
helps to clarify the role of social identity salience and social influence in the stress 
process. Importantly, it provides an alternative and more comprehensive perspective 
to the cognitive appraisal of stress. We will now turn to the empirical chapters that 
attempt to test these ideas.
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Figure 4.1: Self-categorization principles and the cognitive appraisal of stress
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66
CHAPTER FIVE
The Contribution of a Shared Social Identity to the 
Provision, Receipt and Benefits of Informational Support
In the foregoing chapters the literatures examining the stress process and the 
social identity approach were reviewed, with the goal of integrating these two 
approaches to provide a more comprehensive account of the stress equation. In the 
fourth chapter, an integrated model was presented that has the potential to further our 
understanding of stress at two integral stages of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) 
transactional model of stress. The current theoretical framework suggests that self­
categorization theory and its explanation of social influence is of particular relevance 
to the process of cognitive appraisal.
The stress literature was reviewed to highlight the limitations of traditional 
theoretical models of stress. As we saw, Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional 
model of stress provides a powerful critique of traditional stimulus and response 
approaches. The centrepiece of their model is the cognitive process of appraisal 
where importance is assigned to the individual’s relational meaning and interpretation 
construed from their interaction with the environment. However, the transactional 
model of stress is problematic to the extent that it fails to provide an adequate account 
of the role of the social context and social interaction that surrounds human behaviour 
and cognitive processes. An examination of Lazarus and Folkman’s transactional 
account of stress has raised the question of why the possibility for group-based 
influence in the appraisal of stressful situations (both at the primary and secondary 
level of analysis) has been overlooked. The process of cognitive appraisal in the
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study of cognition, emotion and behaviour to date is founded upon a psychological 
approach dominated by individualism. Although Lazarus and Folkman may have 
furthered our understanding of stress, a more comprehensive account of the stress 
process needs to take into account the role of social identity and social factors. At this 
stage, the transactional equation fails to incorporate a person’s social identity into the 
cognitive appraisal process. Moreover, while Lazarus and Folkman discuss the 
importance of the social network in the provision, receipt and benefits of social 
support, little consideration has been given to how this may actually take place from a 
social psychological perspective. Thus far, the literature asserts that social support 
may intervene in the stress process by preventing or ameliorating a stress appraisal 
but the social psychological mechanisms that enables this to take place have not been 
appropriately specified.
Indeed, Schächter (1959) furthered the argument for the role of social factors 
when he applied social comparison theory to the study of threat and emotion. A 
number of studies have collectively demonstrated that people prefer to affiliate with 
similar others when they are placed in threatening situations (Gerard & Rabbie, 1961; 
Gump & Kulik, 1997; Kulik et al., 1996). However, under this model, social 
influence in its restricted form of informational influence is seen as a secondary 
process that only comes into play when direct individual testing is difficult. Here 
individuals merely act as extensions of one’s individual sensory apparatus and such 
influence is not, therefore, a group process but at best an interpersonal averaging 
(Turner, 1987, 1991). On this basis, individuals are assumed only to influence others 
by virtue of the (asocial) valid information they possess. Hence, the influence of 
social support in the appraisal of stressful situations has been assumed to depend 
simply on its informational content. While the literature indicates the potential for
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social factors to impact upon the stress process, a truly social psychological 
explanation has yet to be provided.
In addition, it is important to note that limited previous research examines the 
impact of social identity in the cognitive appraisal process. Research by James (1995,
1997) suggests that our group memberships are in fact capable of influencing all types 
of emotions, cognitions and behaviours. James (1995, 1997) basically concludes that 
minority worker’s salient racial identities in majority dominated organisations is what 
leads to identity-relevant stressors for minority workers that are different to the 
identity-irrelevant stressors for majority workers. He also asserts that social identity 
is related to the availability and quality of social support that minority workers receive 
on the job. To illustrate, in one study, minority workers reported lower levels of 
social support at work than their majority counterparts. Additionally, the support 
minority workers received was less likely to be related to positive health outcomes. 
Nevertheless, although James attempts to integrate social identity theory and the stress 
process, he fails to define the concept of psychological stress. Furthermore, he 
overlooks the importance of the cognitive appraisal process and the mechanisms 
behind integrating social identity and stress are not specified. Finally, the approach is 
limited in its capacity to provide a detailed analysis of when social support will be 
beneficial and who will be qualified to give it.
At present only one study in the stress literature provides some support for the 
integration of self-categorization principles and the cognitive appraisal process. 
Specifically, Jacobs and Haslam (2000) have pointed to the benefits of receiving 
support about the nature o f a stressful situation from someone with whom one shares 
social identity -  an ingroup member. Having said that though, Jacobs and Haslam 
(2000) only examined the effect of receiving support in relation to an upcoming
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potentially stressful task. They did not examine the benefits of receiving support 
between undertaking several stressful tasks. That is, they did not assess whether the 
stress response lowered after receiving informational support. Finally, this study did 
not explore the difference between receiving support when an individual’s personal 
identity or social identity was salient.
It can be seen from the research presented in earlier chapters, that there is 
clearly scope for a better understanding of the relevance of social identity and social 
influence to the stress literature. Attempts to specify the role of social identity 
salience in Lazarus and Folkman’s cognitive appraisal process would appear to be an 
important first step. In this chapter, two experiments will be presented that work 
towards establishing the mechanisms behind integrating cognitive appraisal of stress 
and self-categorization processes. The main goal here is to examine how the 
contribution of a shared social identity in the provision and receipt of informational 
support impacts on the cognitive appraisal process
To briefly recapitulate, self-categorization theory posits that our interaction 
with other people varies as a consequence of our perceived group memberships. It is 
important to remember that the way in which people shape and change our b ehaviours 
and cognitions is dependent upon the shared categorical nature of self (McGarty et al., 
1994; Turner 1991, Turner et al., 1994). In a similar vein, a shared social identity 
should exert influence over the cognitive and emotional processes involved in 
appraising and responding to potentially stressful situations. In this way, 
informational support should influence how people appraise (and cope with) 
potentially stressful situations when it is provided to the stress sufferer by a person 
they categorize as similar to self. This is less likely to be the case when the stress 
sufferer categorizes the source as different to self. Thus, information about the
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stressful nature of an event or situation should enable people to acquire new 
interpretations and clarify their understanding when it is provided to the appraiser by 
a person who is seen as qualified to inform him or her about social reality (ie., an 
ingroup member). This is an alternative perspective to social comparison theory 
(Festinger, 1954; and Schachter’s application of social comparison theory to the stress 
domain) where the persuasiveness of a message is only dependent on the information 
provided.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, the between-subject variable that was manipulated was 
self-definition, with participants being allocated to either a personal identity or social 
identity condition. Importantly, the existing social category membership of being a 
psychology student was selected in the social identity condition. In the study, 
participants performed an initial set of arithmetic exercises (Carroll, Turner & 
Hellawell, 1986; Katkin, Dormit & Wine, 1993) and then indicated how they felt 
during the task on measures designed to assess anxiety and the stress response. 
Before completing another set of arithmetic tasks, participants were required to write 
down three statements that another student might find helpful if they performed the 
task again. They then received the responses of another student (in actual fact a 
standard set of responses). After completing the second set of arithmetic exercises, 
participants rated their stress response again.
Based on self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987, 1991), the primary 
prediction was that the stress response would lower across the two sets of arithmetic 
tasks in the social identity condition where the participant received informational
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support from a participant who shared the same social identity (a psychology student). 
However, the same feedback was expected to have less impact on the participants’ 
perceptions, and play a negligible role in ameliorating stress in the personal identity 
condition where the participant receives feedback from another individual. Overall, 
then, it can be seen that the stress response is predicted to vary interactively as a 
function of self-definition and study phase. These predictions are presented 
schematically in Figure 5.1.
higher
Stress
Response
lower
time 2time 1
Study Phase
Social
Identity
Personal
Identity
Figure 5 1 : Predictions for Experiment 1
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METHOD
5.1 Participants and Design
The participants were 58 year 11 and 12 psychology students from a Canberra 
senior high school who were asked to participant in a scheduled class time. Forty 
nine were female, nine were male and their median age was 17. A two -way factorial 
design was employed, with one between-subject factor (self-definition: personal 
identity/social identity), and one within-subject factor (study phase: time 1/time 2). 
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions. There were 28 participants in the 
personal identity condition and 30 participants in the social identity condition.
The primary dependent measures were the participants’ self-reported level of 
stress during the first and second set of arithmetic tasks. Secondary dependent 
measures included the correct number of responses generated to the addition and 
subtraction exercises and a series of post-test manipulation checks.
5.2 Materials and Procedure
On arriving to the study, participants were seated at separate desks and they 
were informed that this study was an investigation of human performance and were 
told that they would perform a number of activities. Participants received a booklet 
titled “A study of performance”. Self-definition was manipulated by applying 
Verkuyten and Hagendoom’s (1998) ‘self-esteem’ manipulation. This was originally 
used to manipulate the salience of nationality but it can be adapted to other contexts 
by changing the wording in the social identity condition (see Haslam, 2001, p. 373).
The personal identity condition booklet stated the following “people differ 
from each other in all kinds of ways, and every person is a unique individual. One
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person loves music and another likes to go for a walk, and another person likes to read 
whereas another likes to go out. How do people differ from you?” Participants were 
asked to indicate what their hobbies were, when they were bom, and whether they 
were concerned with their general appearance. Participants then indicated their 
agreement with a number of statements on seven-point response scales (where 1 = do 
not agree at all, 7 = agree completely). Examples of the statements are as follows:
1) On the whole I am satisfied with my life
2) I feel I do not have much to be proud of
3) I take a positive attitude towards myself
4) I wish I could have more respect for myself.
A sample booklet from the personal identity condition is included in Appendix A.
The social identity condition booklet stated the following “people belong to all 
kinds of groups, such as sports clubs, political parties, religious groups and also a 
nation. These groups differ from each other and can also compare themselves with 
others. One sport club can compare itself with another, one political party with 
another, one nation with another”. Participants were asked to indicate when they 
started to study psychology, what area of psychology they find most interesting, and 
what area of psychology they find the least interesting. Participants then indicated 
their agreement with a number of statements on seven-point response scales (where 1 
= do not agree at all, 7 = agree completely). Examples of the statements are as 
follows:
1) I feel good about being a psychology student
2) Overall, I often do not like being a psychology student
3) Being a psychology student is important to me
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4) If I could have my time again, I would want to be a psychology student 
again.
Participants were then required to complete a mental arithmetic task, 
consisting of a series of addition and a series of subtraction exercises displayed on a 
video screen. The instructions displayed on the video stated that:
This study investigates human performance.
The study looks at people’s performance on arithmetic tasks.
You will be given a set of arithmetic tasks to complete within a limited 
time. The questions will get harder over time.
Here are a few examples: 13 + 35, 20 + 57, 76 - 59.
Mental arithmetic tasks were employed as a basis for potential threat appraisals 
because they have been found to satisfy this purpose in previous research. Further, 
they can be administered easily and in a standardised manner (Carroll et al., 1986; 
Katkin et al., 1993). Presenting a task as one that must be performed and be 
performed quickly can result in threat related appraisals (Tomaka et al., 1997). As the 
video progressed the questions became more difficult and participants were given less 
time to answer them. There were 16 items in each addition and subtraction exercise. 
The addition set was presented first followed by the subtraction set. The first five 
items of each set were displayed for 2.5 seconds, items 6 to 10 were displayed for 2 
seconds, items 11 to 15 were displayed for 1.5 seconds and item 16 was displayed for 
1 second. There was a black space of 3 seconds between each item. The participants 
recorded their answers in the spaces provided in the response booklet (refer to 
Appendix B for a copy of the mental arithmetic tasks).
At the completion of this task, participants were asked to indicate their 
agreement with a number of statements on seven-point scales (where 1 = do not agree
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at all, 7 = agree completely). Seven items required participants to rate how they felt 
during the arithmetic task. The items included (a) I was more worried that I normally 
am, (b) I felt more nervous and ill at ease than I normally do, (c) I had more difficulty 
concentrating than I normally do, (d) I felt more anxious than I normally do, (e) my 
face was more flushed than it normally is, (f) my heart was pounding more than it 
normally does and (g) I felt more discomfort in my stomach than I normally do.
These items were adapted from the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch & Lushene, 1983) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 
1993). Reliability and validity of both instruments has been well-documented 
(Spielberger et al., 1983). Such short forms of these inventories have been shown 
elsewhere to provide valid measures of state anxiety (Kulik et al., 1996; O ’Neil, 
Spielberger & Hansen, 1969). Participants then responded to an item asking them 
how important it was to be a psychology student. This question was intended as a 
manipulation check to assess the success of the social identity manipulation (see 
Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds & Turner, 1999).
Next, the participants were asked to write three supportive and helpful 
statements that they would give to another student if they had to perform the 
arithmetic task again. The responses were collected and placed into a sealed box. 
Participants were told that they would receive another student’s response set. 
However, the participants actually received a standard set of responses that were 
selected from a side compartment within the box. These responses were intended to 
be supportive. The standard set of responses stated:
1 )  1 found the tasks quite hard
2) Set 2 was harder than Set 1
3) It was good when it stopped.
76
Participants then completed another series of addition and subtraction 
exercises displayed on the video. They recorded their answers in the spaces provided 
in the response booklet and then re-rated how they felt during the arithmetic task to 
the same seven items that were employed in study phase 1. Participants also re-rated 
how important it was to be a psychology student. The next five items required 
participants to indicate (a) whether they found the feedback from the other student 
supportive, (b) how they were able to cope with the arithmetic tasks, (c) how they 
would generally describe themselves, (d) how interested they were in the study and (e) 
how much attention they devoted to the study’s instructions and tasks. These 
manipulation items examined some of the general factors that are considered to affect 
the stress response. Two items were selected from the Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 
1965) to measure personal self-esteem on seven-point scales (where 1 = do not agree 
at all, 7 = agree completely). The items were (a) on the whole I am satisfied with 
myself and (b) all in all I am inclined to feel like a failure. In addition, two items 
were selected from the private subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem scale (Luhtanen 
& Crocker, 1992) to assess collective self-esteem. This general measure of collective 
self-esteem can be adapted to suit the particular social category of interest. Here, the 
items assessed the collective esteem associated with being a psychology student (on 
seven-point scales, where 1 = do not agree at all, 7 = agree completely). These items 
included: (a) I often regret that I am a psychology student and (b) in general, I am glad 
to be a psychology student
Finally, participants were asked to provide their age and sex. When 
participants completed this information they were debriefed and thanked for their
involvement.
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RESULTS
Data collected in this experiment were; (a) the participants’ self-reported level 
of stress during the first and second set of arithmetic tasks, (b) the correct number of 
responses to each of the addition and subtraction exercises, and (c) the participants’ 
responses to a series of post-test manipulation checks. The unit of analysis was the 
participants’ individual scores on the above measures. The manipulation checks are 
presented in Table 5.1
Table 5.1
List of Manipulation Questions and the Variable Name
Manipulation Question Variable Name
The extent to which participants found the feedback 
support Feedback Supportive
The extent to which the participants were able to 
cope with the mental arithmetic tasks Cope with Tasks
How the participants generally describe themselves General Stress
How interesting they found the study Study Interesting
How much attention they devoted to the study’s 
instructions and tasks Attention to Tasks
The extent to which participants feel like a failure Feel Failure
How satisfied participants are with themselves Satisfied with Self
The extent to which they regret being a psychology 
student Regret Psychology
How glad they are to be a psychology student Glad Psychology
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Measures assessing the subjective stress response were collapsed to create two 
new variables: affect and somatic at study phase time 1 and time 2. As in previous 
research, the affect variable averaging responses to the items: worried, nervous and ill 
at ease, difficulty concentrating and anxious formed a reliable scale at time phase 1 
(a = .83) and time phase 2 (a  = .81). The somatic variable that averaged responses to 
the following items: face flushed, discomfort in the stomach, and heart pounding also 
formed a reliable scale at time 1 (a = .75) and time 2 (a  = .75; e.g., see Spielberger et 
al., 1983, Beck & Steer, 1993). Means and standard deviations for the affect and 
somatic variables are presented in Table 5.2.
The appropriate reverse coding of measures to assess personal self-esteem and 
collective self-esteem was performed and the questions were collapsed to form two 
new variables, personal self-esteem (PSE) and collective self-esteem (CSE).
Consistent with previous research, PSE and CSE formed reliable scales (a = .87, a  = 
.72, respectively; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Rosenberg, 1965).
5.3 Analytic Strategy
The analysis proceeded through five stages. First, the a priori predictions for 
affect and somatic variables were assessed by means of within group t-tests. In the 
second stage, overall effects were investigated with a doubly multivariate MANOVA. 
Next, significant effects in the MANOVA were investigated with univariate follow-up 
tests. In the fourth stage, the manipulation checks were assessed by means of between 
group t-tests. Finally, the performance scores at study phase 1 and study phase 2 were 
analysed by using an ANOVA.
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5.4 Measures of the stress response
In line with the predictions, the analyses revealed that the affective response of 
stress significantly lowered from time 1 to time 2 for participants in the social identity 
condition (Ms 4.89 to 4.31, t (29) = 2.44, p<05; Cohen’s d=  .45; power = .65). 
However, there was no difference in the personal identity (Ms = 4.49 to 4.09, t (27) = 
1.33, ns; Cohen’s d = .25; power = .25).
Looking at the somatic response of stress, there was a significant difference 
for participants in the social identity condition between time 1 and time 2 (Ms 3.87 to 
3.40, t (29) = 2.06, p<.05; Cohen’s d= .38, power = .51). Again there was no such 
effect for participants in the personal identity condition (Ms = 3.43 to 3.46, t_ (27) =
0.10, ns; Cohen’s d = .02; power = .04).
Table 5.2
Means and Standard Deviations of the Affect and Somatic variables as a Function of
Self-Definition and Studv Phase
Affect 1 Affect 2 Somatic 1 Somatic 2
Self-Definition N M(S.D.) M(S.D.) M(S.D.) M(S.D.)
Personal Identity 28 4.49(1.62) 4.09(1.54) 3.43(1.73) 3.46(1.48)
Social Identity 30 4.89(1.22) 4.37(1.00) 3.87(1.34) 3.40(1.28)
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5.4.1 Multivariate effects
Using affect and somatic scores at both study phase time 1 and time 2 as the 
dependent variables, there was a significant main multivariate effect for study phase 
(F (2,55) = 3.32, p<.05). No effects emerged for self-definition (F_ (2,55) = 0.52, ns) 
or self-definition by study phase (F (2,55) = 0.79, ns).
5.4.2 Univariate follow-up tests
The affect and somatic variables were subjected to a 2(Self-Definition) x 
2(Study Phase) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last factor (Table 
5.3). For the affect variable, the only effect to emerge was a significant main effect 
for study phase (F (1,56) = 6.64, p< 01; Eta-Sqd = .06; power = .25), with perceived 
affective symptoms of stress being lower at time 2. This effect was not qualified by 
the predicted interaction between self-definition and study phase (F (1,56) = 0.23, ns; 
Eta-Sqd = .004; power = .05). No effects emerged for the somatic variable.
Table 5.3
Univariate Follow-up Tests of Self-Definition and Study Phase for the Affect and
Somatic variables
IV DV F df 2
Self-Definition Affect 1.05 (1/56) ns
Somatic 0.95 (1/56) ns
Study Phase Affect 6.64 (1/56) <.01
Somatic 1.16 (1/56) ns
Self-Definition x Affect 0.23 (1/56) ns
Study Phase Somatic 1.56 (1/56) ns
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5.5 Manipulation check for social identity salience
To assess the strength of the self-definition manipulation, between group 
t-tests were performed comparing the level of identification with other psychology 
students in the personal identity and social identity condition. There was no 
difference on this measure either at time 1 or time 2 (personal identity time 1 M_=
4.57 vs. social identity time 1 M = 4.67, t (56) = 0.92, ns; personal identity time 2 
M = 4.61 vs. social identity time 2 M = 4.57, t (56) = 0.96, ns). This finding suggests 
that the question failed to assess the manipulation of social identity salience. All of 
the participants reported that they identified moderately with psychology students. 
Thus the question may have examined the participants’ level of identification with a 
social category that applied to all of the participants as opposed to checking the 
manipulation of social identity salience (importantly all of the participants were 
psychology students). Alternatively though, the manipulation of social identity 
salience may not have been successful.
5.6 Manipulation checks
The responses to the seven manipulation measures were each analysed by 
means of between group t-tests (Table 5.4). These tests revealed no differences in the 
responses of participants in personal identity and social identity conditions on any 
measure. But there was a trend suggesting that there was a difference in the 
participants’ level of interest in the study between the personal identity and social 
identity conditions (t (56) = 1.95, p=  .06). However, the absolute values indicated all 
of the participants were moderately interested in the study. The means and their 
associated standard deviations are presented in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4
Means, Standard Deviations and t-values as a Function of Self-Definition
Personal Identity 
(N=28)
Social Identity 
(N=30) t E
Feedback Supportive 3.25(2.05) 3.20(2.02) 0.09 ns
Cope with Tasks 2.71(1.36) 3.20(1.45) 1.32 ns
General Stress 4.07(1.61) 4.10(1.24) 0.08 ns
Study Interesting 4.61(1.57) 3.87(1.31) 1.96 ns
Attention to Tasks 5.14(1,48) 5.40(1.33) 0.70 ns
Personal Self-Esteem 4.95(1.52) 4.75(1.29) 0.53 ns
Collective Self-Esteem 5.05(1.79) 4.95(1.52) 0.24 ns
As can be seen in Table 5.4 there is little variability in the participants’ 
responses to the following variables: (a) Feedback Supportive, (b) Cope with Tasks, 
(c) General Stress, (d) Attention to Tasks, (e) Personal Self- Esteem and (f) Collective 
Self-Esteem.
Additionally, all of the participants found the feedback mildly supportive, did 
not cope relatively well with the tasks, reported a moderate amount of general stress, 
devoted a moderate amount of attention to the study’s instructions and reported a 
moderate to high amount of personal and collective self-esteem.
5.7 M easures o f  perform ance
The number of correct responses to the addition and subtraction exercises 
were found to be significantly correlated at time 1 and time 2 (time 1 r = .67, p<01; 
time 2 r = .68 p <01). Cronbach’s reliability coefficient for the correct responses at 
time 1 was 0.71 and at time 2 was 0.73. This suggests some consistency in the
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number of responses to the addition and subtraction exercises at time 1 and time 2. 
Accordingly, the number of correct responses to the addition and subtraction exercises 
were added together to form a performance score at time 1 (Perform 1) and a 
performance score at time 2 (Perform 2).
Then, the performance score at time 1 and the performance score at time 2 was 
subjected to a 2(Self-Definition) x 2(Study Phase) analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on the last factor. Scores differed significantly as a function of study phase, 
with performance improving from time 1 to time 2 (Ms 11.14, 14.14, respectively;
F (1,56) = 32.81, p<.001). No other effects emerged from the analysis. Relevant 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5
Means and Standard Deviations of the Performance Scores as a Function of Self-
Definition and Study Phase
Perform 1 Perform 2
Self-Definition N M(S.D.) M(S.D.)
Personal Identity 28 9.36(6.60) 13.04(7.83)
Social Identity 30 12.67(7.92) 15.07(7.40)
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DISCUSSION
As predicted, when participants received informational support from a 
participant who shared the same social identity (a psychology student) their perceived 
affective and somatic symptoms of stress lowered from time 1 to time 2. However, 
this same effect was not observed when participants’ personal identity was salient and 
they where given the same information but from an individual. Although the patterns 
observed on the primary measures support our experimental hypotheses, it is worth 
noting that there was no predicted interaction between self-definition and study phase 
in the analysis of variance.
Failure to observe the theoretical interaction between self-definition and study 
phase may reflect the study’s lack of statistical power. For example, looking at the 
affect variable the power estimate for the interaction was around 0.05. According to 
Cohen (1988) power estimates need to be at least around 0.80. Importantly too, the 
effect size was around 0.004. Cohen (1988, Smithson, 2000) offers benchmarks 
where a small effect size = 0.2, a medium effect size = 0.5 and a large effect size 
= 0.8. The low level of statistical power observed in this experiment increases the 
chance of a Type II error rate that would lead to a failure to detect a real effect. In 
essence, the results suggest that to yield more statistically elegant and theoretically 
refined data, the power estimate of the study needs to be improved. This could be 
achieved by three means; (a) testing a larger sample, (b) improving the effect size, or 
(c) changing the acceptable level of Type I error (Cohen, 1988, Judd, McClelland & 
Culhane, 1995; Smithson, 2000).
Changing the acceptable Type I error rate should only be considered when the 
other options prove impossible to manipulate. An alternative way to improve 
statistical power could be to amend the study’s design so that a larger effect size is
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anticipated (Judd et al., 1995). Here, then, to increase power some design 
modifications need to be made when conducting another experiment. One way that 
this may be achieved is to strengthen the social identity salience manipulation. In 
essence, if participants were given the opportunity to interact with their group 
members and complete the manipulation as group and if they devised a nickname for 
their group, group membership may have been more psychologically meaningful and 
self-involving. Finally, (and relatively simple to implement) another study should 
also test a larger sample size. There is no doubt that the current experiment needs to 
be replicated with an appropriate sample size.
The manipulation checks indicated that there was no difference between 
participants on some of the general factors that are considered to affect the stress 
response. However, in this experiment, the social category membership applied to all 
of the participants and therefore the manipulation check of social identity salience 
may have failed to assess social identity salience appropriately. Finally, social 
category factors appear not to be implicated in a difference in performance between 
the conditions. All of the participants’ performance improved during the second set 
of arithmetic exercises.
Notwithstanding the above statistical and methodological considerations, the 
present study challenges Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) original conceptualisation of 
the stress process by incorporating social wellbeing. Thus, the primary appraisal 
process entails the relevance and importance of a stressful event or situation to the 
individual’s personal or social identity (depending upon the context-dependent nature 
of self-categorization processes). Over and above this claim, it is essential to 
highlight that the present findings also play an important role in attempting to clarify 
the role of social influence and group memberships in the appraisal of (and the
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individual’s ability to cope with) potentially stressful events. As predicted by self­
categorization theory, it appears that it is not the positive informational content per se 
that influences how individual’s appraise and cope with stressful events, but the 
extent to which the content is validated by social psychological means -  with relevant 
others in a context of a shared social identity (McGarty et al, 1994; Turner et al.,
1994). Moreover, informational support from ingroup members when our social 
identities are salient has more of an impact than information provided by an 
individual when our personal identity is salient. This is because ingroup members 
share the same social perspective as the perceiver and hence they are seen to be more 
informative about underlying reality (Turner, 1987, 1991). Only when the source 
shares the same social perspective as the perceiver is the informational support they 
offer likely to prove beneficial. This analysis indicates that cognitive appraisal is a 
much more fluid process than is commonly implied in the stress-related literature 
(Levine & Reicher, 1996).
Accordingly, the above analysis suggests that as different identities become 
salient in different contexts, the way in which individuals appraise and cope with the 
same information will change. The social context is therefore essential not only 
because it affects the information to which an individual is exposed but also because it 
influences how any information is construed. This is an alternative view to previous 
research (after Festinger, 1954) that has conceptualised the effect of social influence 
on appraisal in terms of informational influence alone, where informational support 
(regardless of the source) has been believed to reduce stress simply by providing a 
person with relevant facts.
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Experiment 2
Again, the aim of this experiment was to demonstrate that the benefit of 
informational support in altering the cognitive appraisal of stress is dependent upon 
the shared categorical nature of self (a shared salient social identity). In this 
experiment, the manipulation of social identity salience was strengthened by allowing 
participants in the social identity condition to sit together and to devise and display a 
group nickname. In addition, the power estimate of this study was improved by 
increasing the sample size (Cohen, 1988; Judd et al., 1995). The procedure of this 
experiment was similar to the first experiment presented in this chapter. Furthermore, 
the primary hypothesis based on self-categorization theory remained unchanged. To 
reiterate, it was predicted that the stress response would lower across the two sets of 
arithmetic tasks in the social identity condition where the participant receives 
informational support from a participant who shares the same social identity (an 
ingroup member). However, the same feedback was expected to have a less impact 
on the participants’ perceptions, and play a negligible role in ameliorating stress in the 
personal identity condition where the participant receives feedback from another 
individual. Thus, the stress response was predicted to vary interactively as a function 
of self-definition and study phase.
METHOD
5.8 Participants and Design
The participants were 79 first year psychology students from the Australian 
National University who received course credit for participating. Sixty were female,
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nineteen were male and their median age was 20. A two-way factorial design was 
employed, with one between subject factor (self-definition: personal/social), and one 
within-subject factor (study phase: time 1/time 2). Participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions. There were 40 participants in the personal identity condition 
and 39 participants in the social identity condition.
The primary dependent measures were the participants ’ self-reported level of 
stress during the first and second set of arithmetic tasks. Secondary dependent 
measures included the correct number of responses generated to the addition and 
subtraction exercises and a series of post-test manipulation checks.
5.9 Materials and Procedure
Participants were informed that this study was an investigation of human 
performance and they were told they would perform a number of activities. 
Participants received a booklet titled “A study of human performance”. This time 
self-definition was manipulated by applying Haslam et al.’s (1999) ‘three things’ 
manipulation. This procedure involves participants reflecting on things that they do 
often, rarely, well and badly.
Participants in the personal identity condition were seated at separate desks. 
Participants completed the following questions: list up to three things that you 
personally do relatively often; three things that you personally do relatively rarely; 
three things that you generally do well; and three things that you generally do badly. 
Participants then wrote a short paragraph indicating what they liked about being an 
individual.
Participants in the social identity condition were seated together as a group 
and completed the ‘three things’ manipulation as a group. Participants completed the
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following questions as a group: list up to three things that you and the members of 
your group do relatively often; list three things that you and the members of your 
group do relatively rarely; list three things that you and the members of your group 
generally do well; and list three things that you and the members of your group 
generally do badly. Participants then completed a short paragraph indicating what 
they liked about their group and then devised a nickname for their group. For the 
remainder of the session, participants wore nametags displaying their group’s 
nickname. To reinforce the social identity manipulation, participants in the social 
identity condition were also required to write their group’s nickname in the space 
provided at the top of each page of the response booklet (a sample booklet from the 
social identity condition is included in Appendix C).
Participants were then required to complete a mental arithmetic task that 
consisted of a series of addition and subtraction exercises that were employed in the 
first study. At the completion of this task, participants were asked to go into separate 
cubicles and indicate their agreement with a number of statements on seven-point 
scales. Seven items required participants to rate how they felt during the arithmetic 
tasks. The items were selected from the first experiment and they included; worried, 
nervous and ill at ease, difficulty concentrating, anxious, face flushed, discomfort in 
the stomach and heart pounding.
Participants remained in the cubicles and were asked to write down three 
statements about the task that they thought another individual or group member might 
find helpful when performing the task again. The experimenter collected the 
responses and the participants were told that they would receive another individual’s 
or group member’s response set. They actually received a standard set of responses 
that were intended to be reasonably supportive. The response included:
1) The tasks were quite hard -  especially set 2
2) You feel better when it stops!
3) There’s more to life than maths!
Once the participants read the statements they went back to their seats and completed 
another series of addition and subtraction exercises that were also selected from the 
first study and recorded their answers in the spaces provided in the response booklet. 
Participants then went back into the cubicles to re-rate how they felt during the 
arithmetic task on the same seven items that were employed in study phase 1. 
Participants then indicated how strongly they identified with other students in the 
room. This question was selected from Doosje et al.’s (1995) four-item measure of 
identification. This scale is a suitable measure of both social identification and social 
identity salience (see Haslam, 2001). An additional six items required participants to 
indicate (a) while conducting the tasks if they thought they had anything in common 
with any of the other students taking part in the study, (b) whether they found the 
feedback from the other student supportive, (c) how they were able to cope with the 
arithmetic tasks, (d) how they would generally describe themselves, (e) how 
interested they were in the study, and (f) how much attention they devoted to the 
study’s instructions and tasks. Participants then indicated their agreement with the 
four items from the first experiment that assessed personal self-esteem and collective 
self-esteem (however, the collective self-esteem questions were a general measure of 
esteem as opposed to assessing esteem for a particular social category).
Finally, participants were asked to provide their age and sex. When 
participants completed this information they were debriefed and thanked for their
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involvement.
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RESULTS
Data collected in this experiment were: (a) the participants’ self-reported level 
of stress during the first and second set of arithmetic tasks, (b) the correct number of 
responses to each of the addition and subtraction exercises, and (c) the participants’ 
responses to a series of post-test manipulation checks. The unit of analysis was the 
participants’ individual scores on the above measures. The manipulation checks are 
presented in Table 5.6
Table 5.6
List of Manipulation Questions and the Variable Name
Manipulation Question Variable Name
The extent to which participants found the feedback 
support Feedback Supportive
The extent to which the participants were able to 
cope with the mental arithmetic tasks Cope with Tasks
How the participants generally describe themselves General Stress
How interesting they found the study Study Interesting
How much attention they devoted to the study’s 
instmctions and tasks Attention to Tasks
The extent to which participants feel like a failure Feel Failure
How satisfied participants are with themselves Satisfied with Self
The extent to which they regret belonging to some 
social groups Regret Social Groups
How glad they are to be a member of the social 
groups they belong to Glad Social Groups
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The affect variable from the first study that averaged responses to the 
following items: worried, nervous and ill at ease, difficulty concentrating, and anxious 
again formed a reliable scale at time 1 (a = .90) and time 2 (a = .91). The somatic 
variable that averaged responses to the following items: face flushed, discomfort in 
the stomach and heart pounding also formed a reliable scale at time 1 (a = .76) and 
time 2 (a = .85). Means and standard deviations for the affect and somatic variables 
are presented in Table 5.7.
The appropriate reverse coding of measures to assess personal self-esteem and 
collective self-esteem was performed and the questions were collapsed to form two 
new variables, personal self-esteem (PSE) and collective self-esteem (CSE).
Consistent with previous research, PSE and CSE formed reliable scales (a = .79 and 
a  = .86, respectively).
5.10 Analytic Strategy
The analysis was the same as Experiment 1 and proceeded in five stages.
Refer to Experiment 1 for a review of the analytic strategy.
5.11 Measures of the stress response
In line with the predictions, the analyses revealed that the affective response of 
stress lowered significantly from time 1 to time 2 for participants in the social identity 
condition (Ms 4.49 to 3.75, t (38) = 3.88, jyc.001; Cohen’s d=  .62; power = .97). 
However, and not in line with the predictions, the affective response of stress also 
lowered significantly for participants in the personal identity condition (Ms 4.45 to 
3.89, t(39) = 2.71 p<01; Cohen’s d= .43; power = .75). Looking at the somatic 
response of stress there was a significant difference for participants in the social
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identity condition between time 1 and time 2 (Ms = 3.68 to 2.97, t (38) = 4.35, 
£<001; Cohen’s d = .70; power = .99). Although not significant, there was also a 
clear trend for the lowering of the stress response in the personal identity condition 
(Ms 3.23 to 2.85, t (39) = 1.93, £  = .06; Cohen’s d = .31; power = .47).
Table 5.7
Means and Standard Deviations of the Affect and Somatic variables as a Function of
Self-Definition and Study Phase
Affect 1 Affect 2 Somatic 1 Somatic 2
Self-Definition N M(S.D.) M(S.D.) M(S.D.) M(S.D.)
Personal Identity 40 4.45(1.45) 3.89(1.44) 3.23(1.51) 2.85(1.43)
Social Identity 39 4.49(1.31) 3.75(1.31) 3.68(1.40) 2.97(1.34)
5.11.1 Multivariate effects
Using affect and somatic scores at both study phase time 1 and time 2 as the 
dependent variables, there was a significant main multivariate effect for study phase 
(F (2,76) = 12.13, p<.001. No effects emerged for self-definition (F{2,76) = 0.69, ns) 
or self-definition by study phase (F (2,76) = 0.80, ns).
5.11.2 Univariate follow-up tests
The affect and somatic variables were subjected to a 2(Self-Defmition) x 
2(Study Phase) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last factor (Table 
5.8). For the affect variable, the only effect to emerge was a significant main effect 
for study phase (F (1,77) = 21.34, £<.001; Eta-Sqd = .22; power = .99), with
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perceived affective symptoms of stress being lower at time 2. This effect was not 
qualified by the predicted interaction between self-definition and study phase 
(F (1,77) = .39, ns; Eta-Sqd = .005; power = .06). For the somatic variable, there was 
also a significant main effect for study phase (F (1,77) = 17.63, jK.001; Eta-Sqd 
= 19; power = .99). Again, this effect was not qualified by the predicted interaction 
between self-definition and study phase (F (1,77) = 1.38, ns; Eta-Sqd = .02; power = 
.21) .
Table 5.8
Univariate Follow-up Tests of Self-Definition and Study Phase for the Affect and
Somatic Variables
IV DV F df E
Self-Definition Affect 0.03 (1/77) ns
Somatic 0.79 (1/77) ns
Study Phase Affect 21.34 (1/77) <.001
Somatic 17.63 (1/77) <.001
Self-Definition x Affect 0.39 (1/77) ns
Study Phase Somatic 1.38 (1/77) ns
5.12 Manipulation check for social identity salience
To assess the strength of the self-definition manipulation a between group 
t-test was performed comparing the level of identification with other students taking 
part in the study in the personal and social identity conditions. There was a 
significant difference in the level of identification between the personal identity and
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social identity conditions (Ms 4.18, 4.95, respectively; t (77) = 2.42, p<.05) with 
participants in the social identity condition identifying more strongly with each other 
than participants in the personal identity condition. This finding indicates the social 
identity salience manipulation was successful.
5.13 Measures of performance
The number of correct responses to the addition and subtraction exercises 
were found to be significantly correlated at time 1 (r = .55, pK.Ol) and time 2 (r = .59, 
p <.01). Cronbach’s reliability coefficient for the correct responses at time 1 was 0.71 
and at time 2 was 0.74. This suggests some consistency in the number of responses to 
the addition and subtraction exercises at time 1 and time 2. Accordingly, the number 
of correct responses to the addition and subtraction exercises were added together to 
form a performance score at time 1 (Perform 1) and a performance score at time 2 
(Perform 2).
The performance score at time 1 and the performance score at time 2 was 
subjected to a 2(Self-Definition) x 2(Study Phase) analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on the last factor. Scores differed significantly as a function of study phase, 
with performance improving from time 1 to time 2 (F (1,77) = 16.96, p<001). No 
other effects emerged from the analysis. Relevant means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 5.9.
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Table 5.9
Means and Standard Deviations of the Performance Scores as a Function of Self- 
Definition and Study Phase
Perform 1 Perform 2
Self-Definition N M(S.D.) M(S.D.)
Personal Identity 40 15.68(8.06) 18.85(8.21)
Social Identity 39 18.85(7.34) 20.46(7.48)
5.14 Manipulation checks
The responses to the eight manipulation measures were each analysed by 
means of between group t-tests. These tests revealed no difference in the responses of 
participants in the personal identity or social identity conditions on any measure. 
However, there was a trend in the predicted direction suggesting that participants in 
the social identity condition found the feedback more supportive than participants in 
the personal identity condition (t (77) = 1.46, p = .09). The means and their 
associated standard deviations are presented in Table 5.10.
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Table 5.10
Means. Standard Deviations and t-values as a Function of Self-Definition
Personal Identity 
(N=40)
Social Identity 
(N=39) t E
Common 5.00(1.47) 5.10(1.33) 0.33 ns
Feedback Supportive 4.48(2.13) 5.05(1.45) 1.46 ns
Cope with Tasks 4.10(1.50) 4.08(1.61) 0.07 ns
General Stress 4.33(1.21) 4.08(1.29) 0.09 ns
Study Interesting 4.48(1.07) 4.87(1.11) 0.04 ns
Attention to Tasks 5.48(0.91) 5.69(0.98) 1.03 ns
Personal Self-Esteem 5.51(1.36) 5.52(1.38) 0.04 ns
Social Self-Esteem 5.73(1.04) 5.78(1.09) 0.24 ns
As can be seen in Table 5.10, all of the participants thought they had 
something in common with each other, coped moderately well with the arithmetic 
tasks, reported a moderate amount of general stress, were interested in the study, 
devoted a lot of attention to the study’s instructions, and reported a high amount of 
personal and collective self-esteem.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 in part replicated the previous experiment. That 
is, when the participants received informational support from a participant who shared 
the same social identity (an ingroup member) their perceived affective and somatic 
symptoms of stress lowered from time 1 to time 2. However, this same effect was 
also observed when participants’ personal identity was salient. Thus, the results failed
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to highlight (based on self-categorization principles) the benefits of informational 
support being only contingent upon the appraiser and provider sharing the same social 
identity (McGarty et al., 1994; Turner, 1991). However, the aim of improving the 
power of this study was achieved. An important point to reflect upon is that Cohen’s 
d did indicate medium effect sizes for the affect and somatic variable in the social 
identity condition (d = 0.62 and 0.70 respectively) but only small effect sizes in the 
personal identity condition (d = 0.43 and 0.31 respectively).
Notwithstanding the present findings, the manipulation check comparing the 
level of identification with other students participating in the study (Doosje et al., 
1995) provided direct support for the success of the social identity salience 
manipulation. Specifically, participants identified more with one another in the social 
identity condition than participants in the personal identity condition.
There are a few possible explanations for the above findings. First, the 
lowering of the stress response in both the personal identity and social identity 
conditions could simple be the result of a practice effect. That is, by knowing what to 
expect the second time around, the participants may have found the arithmetic task 
easier. In line with this argument, there was an improvement in the average number 
of correct responses to the arithmetic exercises when participants performed the task 
the second time. It is therefore essential for any further research to include a 
condition that receives no informational support or feedback, so that the possible 
confound of a practice effect can be examined. Put simply, if the stress response was 
to lower in conditions were no informational support is provided this would suggest 
the possibility that results improved from practice rather than social support.
A second interpretation of the results obtained is that the ecological validity of 
the current experiment was poor. At the most basic level, the participants may not
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have appraised the situation and their performance on the arithmetic tasks as 
particularly threatening (importantly, the self-reported stress response was only 
moderate in all experimental conditions). They may have had no interest in the 
consequences of their performance and probably no interest in the experimenter’s 
evaluation. If we recall the review of the stress literature, in order for a situation to be 
stressful it needs to be perceived as such by the individual. Thus, for psychological 
stress to arise, an individual needs to anticipate that he or she will not be able to cope 
with a situation, or failure to meet any demand needs to be anticipated by the 
appraiser as personally significant (Folkman et al., 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
Along these lines, the importance of performing and the experimenter’s evaluation of 
it could be made more realistic in another study by providing the participants with 
performance scores or by making the consequences of poor performance threatening. 
For example, if the participants were led to believe that they might be selected for a 
training video (if they perform poorly) at the completion of the experiment, this may 
make their performance more relevant and meaningful.
The experiments presented in this chapter represent the first attempt to clarify 
the role of social identity and social influence in the appraisal of stressful situations. 
In this respect, it is important to reflect upon some of the issues outlined above. 
Specifically, the relationship between informational support and self-definition may 
be more complex than what was initially hypothesised. Any further design needs to 
take this into consideration. Importantly, the possible confound of a practice effect 
has to be explored. Also, the stressor needs to be made more realistic and 
performance has to be more self-involving and meaningful to the participants. Even 
though the current experiment has not demonstrated the benefits of informational 
support being limited to conditions where the appraiser and provider share the same
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social identity, it does suggest that the Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional 
account of stress needs to also incorporate social wellbeing. In a similar vein to the 
first experiment presented in this chapter, the current findings tend to suggest that the 
primary appraisal process reflects the significance of a threatening situation to the 
individuals’ personal identity and social identity.
The study presented in the following empirical chapter attempts to amend 
some of the methodological issues highlighted above and to improve our 
understanding of the relevance of social identity and social influence to the stress 
process. Based on self-categorization theory, the following chapter will examine 
social identity salience at two different stages of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) 
transactional model.
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CHAPTER SIX
Examining the Role of Social Identity in the Cognitive 
Appraisal Process
In light of the methodological concerns outlined in the foregoing empirical 
chapter, the experiment reported in this chapter ensured (a) that no feedback 
conditions were included to control for the possibility of a practice effect and (b) the 
ecological validity of the experiment was improved by making the stressor and 
performance on the arithmetic tasks more realistic to participants.
It is the intention of the study reported in this chapter to examine the role of 
social identity salience at two different stages of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) 
transactional model of stress. First, based on self-categorization theory, it is 
suggested that for a situation to be appraised as threatening and stressful it must be 
perceived as relevant and important to one’s personal identity or social identity. 
Importantly, this process is dependent upon the context and how the self is defined in 
that context. Second (and consistent with the previous experiments), the benefits of 
informational support should be evident when the appraiser and provider share the 
same social identification and accompanying perspective. Specifically, informational 
support about the stressful nature of an event or situation should influence the 
cognitive appraisal process when the appraiser identifies with the provider, perceives 
him or her as an ingroup member and internalises that group membership as an aspect 
of their self-concept (McGarty et al., 1994; Turner, 1991).
Accordingly, the aims of this study were threefold. First, to examine how the 
impact of a stressor varies as a function of its perceived relevance and importance to
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self. Second, to examine the benefits of receiving informational support about a 
testing situation that is relevant to self from a person who shares the same social 
identity. Third, to ensure that the provision of informational support lowers the stress 
response as opposed to a practice effect.
In this experiment, three between-subjects variables were manipulated: self­
definition, threat and feedback. Self-definition varied across two levels, participants 
being allocated to either a personal identity or social identity condition. Self- 
definition was manipulated by asking participants to reflect on the things they (or 
their group) do often, rarely, well and badly. In the social identity condition, group 
membership was made salient and meaningful by also providing participants with the 
opportunity to interact with their group members and devise a nickname for their 
group. Participants were also allocated to either an individual threat or group threat 
condition, with participants being told that their individual or group’s performance on 
several arithmetic tasks would be compared to that of other individuals or groups (to 
obtain the lowest individual or group scores). It was assumed that the threat 
instmctions would (a) further heighten the salience of the participants’ social identity 
when the threat was identity-relevant and (b) would be more likely to result in a threat 
appraisal (and the associated negative emotions of anxiety) when the arithmetic task 
was identity-relevant than if it was identity-irrelevant (see Tajfel, 1971; Turner, 
Probasco, Leve, 1992). Finally, participants were allocated to either a feedback or no 
feedback condition, with participants in the feedback condition receiving information 
from other individuals or group members about their opinions of the tasks and where 
they felt their performance fell in comparison to others.
In the study, participants performed an initial set of arithmetic exercises and 
then indicated how they felt during the task on measures from the previous two
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experiments to assess the stress response. Before completing another set of arithmetic 
exercises, participants in the feedback conditions were required to indicate how they 
found the task and where they thought their performance fell in comparison to others. 
Participants were told that their responses would be distributed to other individuals or 
group members and they would receive the responses of others (in actual fact they 
received a standard set of responses). After completing the second set of arithmetic 
exercises, participants rated their stress response again. The general hypotheses were: 
(a) the participants’ experience of stress will be high only in conditions where the 
threat instructions and arithmetic tasks are relevant to the participants’ personal 
identity or social identity, (b) the stress response should lower across the two sets of 
arithmetic tasks only when the participants receive feedback from someone who 
shares the same social identity -  an ingroup member, and finally (c) the stress 
response should not significantly lower in the no feedback conditions.
On the basis of self-categorization theory, a number of more specific 
predictions were derived about the form of which the results of this study would take. 
Initially when participants perform the first set of arithmetic tasks it was anticipated 
that:
1) when a participant’s personal identity is salient and a threat is appraised at 
the individual level, the experience of stress will be high because the 
stressor is perceived as relevant to self
2) when a participant’s social identity is salient and a threat is appraised at 
the group level, the experience of stress will be high because the stressor is 
perceived as relevant to self
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3) when a participant’s personal identity is salient and the threat is appraised 
at the group level, the experience of stress will be low because the stressor 
is not intended to be perceived as relevant to self
4) when a participant’s social identity is salient and the threat is appraised at 
the individual level, the experience of stress will be low because the 
stressor is not intended to be perceived as relevant to self.
Overall, then, it can be seen that the stress response is predicted to vary interactively 
as a function of self-definition and threat. These predictions are presented 
schematically in Figure 6.1.
Under conditions of feedback it was anticipated that predictions 1, 3 and 4 
would still hold when participants performed the second set of arithmetic exercises. 
On the other hand when the participants’ social identity is salient and the threat is at 
the group level and participants receive feedback from two other individuals who are 
purported to share the same social identity -  an ingroup member, the stress response 
should lower across the two sets of tasks. These predictions are presented 
schematically in Figure 6.2. However, under conditions of no feedback it was 
anticipated that predictions 1, 2, 3 and 4 would still hold when participants performed 
the second set of arithmetic tasks and these predictions are presented schematically in 
Figure 6.3.
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Figure 6,2: Experimental predictions for feedback conditions (study phase time 2)
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Figure 6.3: Experimental predictions for no feedback conditions (study phase time 2)
METHOD
6.1 Participants and Design
The participants were 78 year 11 and 12 students from a Canberra senior high 
school who were asked to participant in a scheduled class time. Fifty were female and 
twenty eight were male and their median age was 17. A four-way factorial design was 
employed, with three between-subjects factors (self-definition: personal/social, threat: 
individual/group, and feedback: feedback/no feedback) and one within-subject factor 
(study phase: time 1/time 2). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight 
independent conditions.
The primary dependent measures were the participants’ self-reported level of 
anxiety and stress during the first and second set of arithmetic tasks. Secondary
dependent measures included the correct number of responses generated to the 
addition and subtraction exercises and a series of post-test manipulation checks.
6.2 Materials and Procedure
On arriving to the study, participants were informed that the study was an 
investigation of human performance and were told that they would perform a number 
of tasks. Participants received a booklet titled “A study of performance”. Again self­
definition was manipulated using Haslam et al.’s (1999) ‘three things’ manipulation. 
Participants in the personal identity conditions were seated at separate desks while 
participants in the social identity conditions were seated together as a group and 
completed the ‘three things’ manipulation as a group. There were two groups in a 
session at a time and they were seated at opposite ends of the room. Participants in the 
social identity condition devised a nickname for their group and for the remainder of 
the session participants wore nicknames displaying their group’s name. They were 
also required to write their group’s nickname in the space provided at the top of each 
page of the response booklet to reinforce the social identity manipulation.
Participants were then introduced to the potential of threat at either the individual or 
group level. The threat manipulation was adapted from a manipulation used by Turner 
et al. (1992). Participants in the individual threat conditions were told:
We are interested in the performance of students on arithmetic tasks. This is 
because today people rely too heavily on calculators and they tend to lose this 
valuable skill. One of the aims of today’s session is to make a training video 
to show other students and teachers how they can improve student arithmetic 
performance. At the end of the experiment we will calculate the scores for
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each individual to find out the lowest scores. We will then make a video of the
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individuals with the lowest scores performing the arithmetic tasks. This will 
provide examples of the mistakes and indicate why they performed so badly. 
This video will then be shown to other students from different schools so that 
they can learn from your mistakes and hopefully not lose this valuable skill. 
Participants in the group threat conditions were told:
We are interested in the performance of students on arithmetic tasks. This is 
because today people rely too heavily on calculators and they tend to lose this 
valuable skill. One of the aims of today’s session is to make a training video 
to show other students and teachers how they can improve student arithmetic 
performance. At the end of the experiment we will calculate the scores for 
each group [or participants in the personal identity condition were told that 
they would randomly be assigned to groups to calculate a group score] to find 
out the groups with the lowest scores. We will then make a video of the 
groups with the lowest scores performing the arithmetic tasks. This will 
provide examples of the mistakes and indicate why they performed so badly. 
This video will then be shown to other students from different schools so that 
they can learn from your mistakes and hopefully not lose this valuable skill.
A video camera was prominently on display to strengthen the threat manipulation.
Participants were then required to complete the first series of addition and 
subtraction exercises that were employed in the previous experiments. At the 
completion of this task, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with the 
same seven items from the previous experiments that assessed how they felt during the 
arithmetic tasks.
Next, participants in the feedback conditions were asked to fill out a response 
sheet indicating how they found the arithmetic tasks and where they saw their
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performance falling. Participants circled one statement on each line asking how they 
found the tasks. The statements varied from:
1) Very easy, quite easy, quite hard to very hard
2) A lot of fun, a bit of fun to no fun at all
3) Not at all challenging, quite challenging to very challenging, and
4) Very simple, quite simple, quite complex to very complex.
Participants then indicated how well they thought they had performed by ticking one 
of the following: top 25%, middle 50%, or bottom 25%. Participants were required to 
fill out two feedback forms in exactly the same way supposedly so that their responses 
could be distributed to two other individuals in the room or two group members. 
Further, they were informed that they would receive two responses from two 
individuals or two group members. The responses were collected and placed into a 
sealed box. However, the participants actually received a standard set of responses 
that were selected from a side compartment within the box. One set of responses 
indicated that the task was very easy, a bit of fun, quite challenging and very simple 
with performance falling in the top 25%. The other set indicated that the task was 
quite easy, a bit of fun, quite challenging and very simple with performance falling in 
the top 25%. The responses were intended to be positive in the social identity 
condition where participants were led to believe that two other group members were 
doing well and thus the potential threat of their group being selected for the video 
would be reduced. In the personal identity condition the responses were not intended 
to be positive, particularly if the participants were performing badly. Specifically, the 
responses indicated that two individuals found the tasks easy and were performing in 
the top 25% and therefore, this should increase the potential threat of being selected
for the video.
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Once the participants read the responses they completed another series of 
addition and subtraction exercises displayed on the video screen. Participants in the 
no feedback conditions completed this series directly after indicating their agreement 
with the seven statements asking how they felt during the arithmetic tasks. At the 
completion of the second set of arithmetic exercises participants then re-rated how 
they felt during the arithmetic task on the same seven items that were employed in 
study phase 1.
Participants then indicated how strongly they identified with other students in 
the room. This question was used in the second experiment to assess the success of 
the social identity manipulation (Doosje et al., 1995). An additional seven 
manipulation checks then required participants to indicate on seven-point scales (a) 
while conducting the tasks if they felt they had anything in common with any of the 
other students taking part in the study, (b) whether the performance of any of the other 
students was important to them on the tasks they had just completed, (c) how they 
were able to cope with the arithmetic tasks, (d) how they would generally describe 
themselves, (e) how interested they were in the study, (f) how much attention they 
devoted to the study’s instructions and tasks and (g) how much they would like to be 
in the video. These manipulation checks examined issues relevant to self­
categorization theory and some of the general factors that are considered to affect the 
stress response.
Participants then indicated their agreement with the two items from the 
previous experiments to assess personal self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965). Participants 
in the feedback conditions also indicated whether they found the feedback from the 
other students helpful. Finally participants were asked to provide their age and sex.
I l l
After participants had completed this information they were debriefed and thanked for 
their involvement.
RESULTS
Data collected in this experiment were: (a) the participants’ self-reported level 
of stress during the first and second set of arithmetic tasks, (b) the correct number of 
responses to each of the addition and subtraction exercises, and (c) the participants’ 
responses to a series of post-test manipulation checks. The unit of analysis was the 
participants’ individual scores on the above measures. The manipulation checks are 
presented in Table 6.1.
6.3 Analytic strategy
The analysis proceeded through five stages. First, to assess identity-relevant 
and identity-irrelevant threat the affect and somatic variables (at study phase 1) were 
subjected to a self-definition by threat (2 x 2) ANOVA. The threat variable was 
dropped from any further analyses due to the failure to obtain the predicted interaction 
between self-definition and threat. In the second stage, overall effects were 
investigated with a doubly multivariate MANOVA. Then, significant effects in the 
MANOVA were investigated with univariate follow-up tests. In the fourth and fifth 
stages manipulation checks and performance scores at study phase 1 and study phase 
2 were analysed using ANOVAs.
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Table 6.1
List of Manipulation Questions and the Variable Name
Manipulation Question Variable Name
The extent to which participants felt they had 
anything in common with any of the other 
participants Common with Other Participants
The extent to which participants thought the 
performance of others was important Performance of Others Important
The extent to which participants identified with 
other students in the room Identify
The extent to which participants were able to 
cope with the mental arithmetic tasks Cope with Tasks
How participants generally describe themselves General Stress
How interesting they found the study Study Interesting
How much attention they devoted to the study’s 
instructions and tasks Attention to Tasks
How much they would like to be in the video at 
the end of the study Be in Video
How satisfied participants are with themselves Satisfied with Self
The extent to which participants feel like a 
failure Feel Failure
Participants in the feedback conditions also indicated the extent to which they 
found the feedback supportive. The affect variable from the previous studies 
averaging responses to the items worried, nervous and ill at ease, difficulty 
concentrating and anxious formed a reliable scale at time phase 1 (a  = .84) and time 
phase 2 (a = .92). The somatic variable that averaged responses to the items face 
flushed, discomfort in the stomach and heart pounding also formed a reliable scale at
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time phase 1 (a  = .76) and time phase 2 ( a  = .86). The participants’ mean affect and 
somatic scores and their associated standard deviations in the eight independent 
conditions are presented in Table 6.2.
The appropriate reverse coding of measures to assess personal self-esteem was 
performed and the two questions were collapsed to form a new variable, personal self­
esteem (PSE). Consistent with the previous studies, PSE formed a reliable scale (a  = 
.64). The participants’ mean responses to the above manipulation checks and their 
associated standard deviations in the eight independent conditions are presented in 
Table 6.3 and 6.4.
Table 6.2
Means and Standard Deviations of the Affect and Somatic variables as a Function of 
Self-Definition, Threat and Feedback
S elf-
D e fin itio n T h re a t F e e d b a c k N
A ffe c t 1 
M (S .D .)
A ffe c t 2 
M (S .D .)
S o m a tic  1 
M (S .D .)
S o m a tic  2 
M (S .D .)
P e rso n a l
Id e n tity In d iv id u a l Y es 9 5 .0 3 (1 .2 2 ) 3 .7 9 (1 .6 5 ) 3 .8 9 (1 .3 7 ) 3 .2 2 (1 .8 1 )
N o 8 3 .9 1 (1 .9 6 ) 3 .8 8 (2 .0 7 ) 3 .4 2 (1 .9 5 ) 3 .1 3 (1 .9 4 )
G ro u p Y es 10 4 .7 3 (2 .2 3 ) 3 .3 0 (2 .0 3 ) 3 .9 3 (1 .7 2 ) 3 .0 7 (1 .6 3 )
N o 10 4 .7 3 (1 .7 0 ) 4 .1 3 (1 .7 3 ) 3 .4 7 (1 .6 0 ) 2 .9 0 (1 .9 3 )
S o c ia l
Id en tity In d iv id u a l Y e s 11 4 .8 6 (1 .1 6 ) 3 .7 7 (1 .5 5 ) 3 .9 7 (1 .2 4 ) 2 .8 2 (0 .8 7 )
N o 11 4 .0 2 (1 .5 6 ) 3 .4 5 (1 .3 3 ) 3 .0 6 (1 .1 4 ) 2 .5 8 (0 .8 6 )
G ro u p Y es 10 4 .5 5 (1 .4 0 ) 3 .9 8 (1 .9 2 ) 3 .5 0 (1 .6 1 ) 3 .0 3 (1 .7 3 )
N o 9 4 .7 5 (0 .5 6 ) 4 .3 3 (0 .7 5 ) 3 .3 7 (1 .6 9 ) 3 .1 9 (1 .2 2 )
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Table 6.3
Means and Standard Deviations of the Manipulation Checks as a Function of Self- 
Definition and Threat for the No Feedback Conditions
Self-Definition: Personal Identity Social Identity
Threat: Individual
(N=8)
Group
(N=10)
Individual
(N=ll)
Group
(N=9)
Common with Other 
Participants 4.63(1.41) 3.90(2.03) 4.55(1.51) 4.00(1.66)
Performance of Others 
Important 3.88(2.17) 4.00(1.70) 3.73(1.62) 3.00(2.24)
Identify 4.00(1.31) 3.50(1.43) 3.82(0.98) 3.33(2.00)
Cope with Tasks 3.00(1.85) 3.40(0.84) 3.00(1.34) 3.44(1.51)
General Stress 4.00(1.31) 4.10(1.20) 3.64(1.69) 3.22(1.20)
Attention to Tasks 5.75(1.39) 4.80(2.04) 5.36(1.12) 5.33(1.23)
Be in Video 2.38(1.41) 1.80(1.32) 1.46(0.69) 2.33(1.58)
Personal
Self-Esteem 4.69(1.75) 4.80(1.36) 4.86(2.06) 5.33(1.30)
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Table 6.4
Means and Standard Deviations of the Manipulation Checks as a Function of Self- 
Definition and Threat for the Feedback Conditions
Self-Definition: Personal Identity Social Identity
Threat: Individual
(N=9)
Group
(N=10)
Individual
(N - l l )
Group
(N=10)
Common with Other
Participants 2.89(1.36) 4.50(1.84) 4.37(1.35) 4.40(2.12)
Performance of Others
Important 3.11 ((1.83) 3.60(2.55) 3.82(1.83) 4.30(1.95)
Identify 3.67(1.12) 4.10(1.52) 4.64(0.92) 5.10(1.52)
Feedback Supportive 3.22((2.11) 2.20(1.48) 3.09(2.07) 3.60(1.35)
Cope with Tasks 3.56(1.94) 3.60(2.01) 3.09(0.94) 3.00(1.49)
General Stress 3.89(1.27) 4.20(1.48) 4.09(0.94) 3.30(1.70)
Attention to Tasks 5.22(1.30) 5.10(1.66) 5.18(0.98) 5.50(1.18)
Be in Video 2.22(1.48) 2.10(1.79) 1.82(1.66) 1.90(1.29)
Personal
Self-Esteem 5.07(1.49) 5.35(1.40) 5.18(1.10) 4.70(1.48)
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6.4 Check for the manipulation of identity-relevant and identity-irrelevant 
threat
Table 6.5 shows participants’ mean Affect and Somatic scores and their 
associated standard deviations in the self-definition and threat conditions prior to the 
manipulation of feedback.
Table 6.5
Means and Standard Deviations of the Affect and Somatic variables at Study Phase 1 
as a Function of Self-Definition and Threat
Self-Definition Threat N
Affect
M(S.D.)
Somatic
M(S.D.)
Personal Identity Individual 17 4.50(1.61) 3.67(1.63)
Group 20 4.73(1.94) 3.70(1.64)
Social Identity Individual 22 4.44(1.41) 3.51(1.26)
Group 19 4.65(1.07) 3.44(1.60)
As can be seen in Table 6.5, looking at the affect variable there was little 
difference between the experimental conditions self-reported level of affective 
symptoms of stress. All of the experimental conditions reported moderate levels of 
stress. Looking at the somatic variable there is also little difference, with all of the 
conditions reporting mild levels of somatic symptoms of stress.
To assess the extent to which the threat instructions and arithmetic tasks varied 
as a function of their perceived relevance to the personal identity and social identity 
conditions, the affect and somatic variables at study phase 1 were subjected to a 
2(Self-Defmition) x 2(Threat) analysis of variance (Table 6.6). No significant effects
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emerged for either the affect or somatic variable. This finding did not therefore 
provide support for the predicted interaction between self-definition and threat (affect; 
F (1,74) = 0.001, ns; Eta-Sqd= .00; power = .03 and somatic; F_( 1,74) = 0.025, ns, 
Eta-Sqd = .00; power = .04). All of the participants reported moderate levels of 
affective symptoms of stress and in addition, all of the participants reported mild 
levels of somatic symptoms of stress. This suggests that the manipulation of identity- 
irrelevant threat (at the participants’ personal identity and social identity) was 
unsuccessful. These instructions caused moderate levels of perceived stress in the 
conditions were threat was intended to be irrelevant to the participants’ salient 
identity. As a result, the threat variable was dropped from the remainder of the 
analyses. The following general hypotheses still remained, (a) the stress response 
should lower across the two sets of arithmetic tasks only when participants receive 
feedback from someone who shares the same social identity -  an ingroup member and 
(b) the stress response should not lower when participants receive no feedback.
6.5 Measures of the stress response
Table 6.7 shows participants’ mean Affect and Somatic variable scores and 
their associated standard deviations in the self-definition and feedback conditions at
study phase time 1 and time 2.
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Table 6.7
Means and Standard Deviations of the Affect and Somatic variables as a Function of
Self-Definition, Feedback and Study Phase
Self-Definition Feedback N
Affect 1 
M(S.D.)
Affect 2 
M(S.D.)
Somatic 1 
M(S.D.)
Somatic 2 
M(S.D.)
Personal Identity Yes 19 4.87(1.79) 3.53(1.82) 3.91(1.52) 3.14(1.67)
No 18 4.36(1.81) 4.01(1.83) 3.44(1.71) 3.00(1.88)
Social Identity Yes 21 4.71(1.26) 3.87(1.69) 3.75(1.41) 2.92(1.32)
No 20 4.35(1.24) 3.85(1.17) 3.20(1.38) 2.85(1.05)
Looking at the affect variable, Table 6.7 shows that the stress response 
lowered more for participants in the personal identity feedback (Ms 4.87 to 3.53) and 
social identity feedback (Ms 4.71 to 3.87) conditions than for participants in the 
personal identity no feedback (Ms 4.36 to 4.01) and social identity no feedback 
conditions (Ms 4.35 to 3.85). A similar pattem can also be seen for the somatic 
variable. The stress response lowered more for participants in the personal identity 
feedback and social identity feedback conditions than for participants in the personal 
identity no feedback and social identity no feedback conditions.
6.5.1 Multivariate effects
Using affect and somatic scores at both study phase time 1 and time 2 as the 
dependent variables, there was a significant multivariate main effect for study phase 
(F (2,73) = 17.85, p<.001) and a significant feedback by study phase interaction 
(F (2,73) = 3.34, p<.05). No other effects emerged from the analysis.
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6.5.2 Univariate follow-up tests
The affect and somatic variables were subjected to a 2(Self-Definition) x 
2(Feedback) x 2(Study Phase) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last 
factor (Table 6.8). For the affect variables, there was a main effect for study phase, 
with perceived affective symptoms of stress being lower at study phase time 2 
(Ms 4.58, 3.81, respectively; F (1,74) = 34.72, p< 001; Eta-Sqd = .32; power = 1.0). 
This effect was qualified by a two-way interaction between feedback and study phase 
(F (1,74) = 6.77, £<01; Eta-Sqd = .08; power = .73), suggesting that the lowering of 
the stress response over time differed between the feedback conditions (Refer to 
Figure 6.4). For the somatic variables, there was a main effect for study phase, with 
perceived somatic symptoms of stress being lower at study phase time 2 (Ms 3.57, 
2.97, respectively; F (1,74) = 20.93, p<001; Eta-Sqd = .22; power = .99). No other 
effects emerged for this analysis.
Stress
Response
time 1 time 2
Study Phase
Feedback
No
Feedback
Figure 6 4: Mean affective response as a function of study phase and feedback
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Tests of the simple effects were conducted to break down the interaction 
between self-definition and feedback for the affect variable. The results indicated that
the affective stress response lowered significantly over the two sets of arithmetic tasks 
for participants in the personal identity feedback condition (t (18) = 5.05, p<.001; 
Cohen’s d = 1.15; power = .99). This finding did not support the prediction where 
feedback was not intended to be beneficial in the personal identity condition. 
However, in line with the predictions, the affective stress response did not lower 
significantly over the two sets of tasks for participants in the personal identity no 
feedback condition (t (17) = 1.42, ns; Cohen’s d = .33; power = .27). This finding 
suggests that practice did not result in a lowering of the stress response across the two 
sets of tasks because of a practice effect. As predicted, the affective stress response 
lowered significantly across the two sets of arithmetic tasks for participants in the 
social identity feedback condition (t (20) = 2.72, p_<.01; Cohen’s d = .59; power = 
.73). Finally, the affective stress response also lowered for participants in the social 
identity no feedback condition (t (19) = 2.76, jK.Ol; Cohen’s d = .62; power = .74) 
and thus did not provide support for the prediction that the stress response would not
lower in this condition.
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Table 6.8
Univariate Follow-up Test of Self-Definition, Feedback and Study Phase for the
Affect and Somatic variables
IV DV F df e
Self-Definition Affect 0.00 (1/74) ns
Somatic 0.38 (1/74) ns
Feedback Affect 0.09 (1/74) ns
Somatic 0.95 (1/74) ns
Study Phase Affect 34.72 (1/74) .001
Somatic 20.93 (1/74) .001
Self-Definition x Affect 0.45 (1/74) ns
Study Phase Somatic 0.01 (1/74) ns
Feedback x Affect 6.77 (1/74) .01
Study Phase Somatic 2.36 (1/74) ns
Self-Definition x Affect 0.07 (1/74) ns
Feedback Somatic 0.00 (1/74) ns
Self-Definition x Affect 1.59 (1/74) ns
Feedback x Study Phase Somatic 0.08 (1/74) ns
6.6 Measures of performance
The number of correct responses to the addition and subtraction exercises 
were found to be significantly correlated at time 1 and time 2 (time 1 r = .73, p<01; 
time 2 r = .64, p< 01). This suggests some consistency in the number of correct 
responses to the addition and subtraction exercises both at study phase time 1 and 
time 2. As in the previous experiments, the number of correct responses to the
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addition and subtraction exercises were added together to form a performance score at 
time 1 (Perform 1) and a performance score at time 2 (Perform 2).
Then, the performance score at time 1 and the performance score at time 2 
were subjected to a 2(Self-Defmition) x 2(Feedback) x 2(Study Phase) analysis of 
variance with repeated measures on the last factor. Scores differed significantly as a 
function of study phase, with performance improving from time 1 to time 2 (Ms 
12.53, 15.22, respectively; F (1,74) = 36.83 p<.001). No other significant effects 
emerged from the analysis. Relevant means and standard deviations are presented in 
Table 6.9.
Table 6.9
Means and Standard Deviations of the Performance Scores as a Function of Self-
Definition, Feedback and Study Phase
Perform 1 Perform 2
Self-Definition Feedback N M(S.D.) M(S.D.)
Personal Identity Yes 19 12.56(8.42) 15.79(8.41)
No 18 10.39(8.52) 13.72(9.18)
Social Identity Yes 21 11.52(5.60) 15.00(5.57)
No 20 15.50(7.90) 16.45(8.20)
123
6.7 Manipulation checks
The responses to the eight manipulation checks were analysed by means of 
2(Self-Definition) x 2(Feedback) analysis of variance (Refer to Appendix D). The 
only effect to emerge from any of the analyses was a feedback effect for the identify 
variable, with identification being higher in the feedback than no feedback conditions 
(Ms 4.37, 3.66, respectively; F (1,74) = 5.37, p<.05). There was a trend for this effect 
to be qualified by a two-way interaction between feedback and self-definition, with 
the participants’ level of identification being higher in the social identity than personal 
identity condition
(F (1,74) = 3.09,j) = .08), however this result was not significant.
Table 6 10 shows participants’ mean responses to the manipulation checks and 
their associated standard deviations in the self-definition and feedback conditions.
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Table 6.10
Means and Standard Deviations of the Manipulation Checks as a Function of Self-
Definition and Feedback
Self-Definition:
Feedback:
Personal Identity Social Identity
Feedback
(N=19)
No feedback 
(N=18)
Feedback
(N=21)
No feedback 
(N=20)
Common with
Other Participants 3.74(1.79) 4.22(1.77) 4.33(1.71) 4.30(1.56)
Performance of
Others Important 3.37(2.19) 3.94(1.86) 4.05(1.86) 3.40(1.90)
Identify 3.90(1.33) 3.72(1.36) 4.86(1.24) 3.60(1.50)
Cope with Tasks 3.58(1.92) 3.22(1.35) 3.05(1.20) 3.20(1.40)
General Stress 4.05(1.35) 4.06(1.21) 3.71(1.38) 3.45(1.47)
Attention to Tasks 5.16(1.46) 5.22(1.80) 5.33(1.07) 5.35(1.14)
Be in Video 2.16(1.61) 2.06(1.35) 1.86(1.46) 1.85(1.23)
Personal
Self-Esteem 5.21(1.41) 4.75(1.50) 4.95(1.28) 5.08(1.73)
As can be seen in Table 6.10, there was little variation in the participants’ 
responses on the following variables; (a) Common with Other Participants,
(b) Performance of Others Important, (c) Cope with Tasks, (d) General Stress,
(e) Study Interesting, (f) Attention to Tasks, (g) Be in Video, and (h) Personal Self - 
Esteem.
In addition, all participants scored in the moderate range regarding their 
perceptions of having something in common with other participants, were moderately 
concerned about the performance of others, devoted a moderate to high amount of 
attention to the study’s instructions, found the study moderately interesting, did not
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cope relatively well with the tasks, reported a moderate amount of general stress, did 
not want to be in the video and reported moderate levels of personal self-esteem. For 
the identify variable, those in the social identity feedback condition revealed moderate 
to high identification with other students in the room and the personal identity 
feedback, personal identity no feedback and social identity no feedback conditions 
identified moderately with other students
The feedback supportive variable was subjected to a between group t-test. 
There was no difference between the personal identity and social identity conditions 
t (38) = 1.15, ns, with all participants finding the feedback relatively unsupportive 
(personal identity feedback M = 2.68 vs. social identity feedback M = 3.33).
DISCUSSION
The first important point to note is that all of the participants appraised the 
situation as moderately stressful at study phase time 1. That is, not only did the 
participants in conditions where the threat or stressor was intended to be relevant find 
the situation stressful, but so did the participants in conditions where the stressor was 
intended to be irrelevant to their salient personal or social identity. Thus the predicted 
interaction between the self-definition and threat did not materialise. It can be 
inferred from the findings that the manipulation of threat as being irrelevant or 
relevant to an individual’s self-concept (in this particular context) was unsuccessful. 
Instead threat, was equally (and moderately) relevant across all experimental
conditions.
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One possible explanation for this finding is that in all of the experimental 
conditions there was a chance that individuals or groups may have had to participate 
in a training video if they performed poorly in comparison to others. Therefore, under 
these circumstances, it is likely that the stressor was relevant in all conditions 
irrespective of whether it was intended to be irrelevant to the participants’ personal or 
social identity because of this increased threat to what was already a potentially 
stressful situation. Moreover, all of the participants indicated that they did not want to 
be on the training video. On the basis of these arguments the threat variable was 
dropped from any of the further analyses.
The second important point to note, looking at the feedback conditions, is that 
the stress response (in particular the affective component) lowered from the first set of 
arithmetic exercises to the second in both the personal identity and social identity 
conditions. It was anticipated that the stress response would only lower in the social 
identity condition where the participants identified with the provider, perceived him 
or her as an ingroup member and internalised that group membership as an aspect of 
their self-concept. Such a result would demonstrate the benefits of a shared social 
identification in relation to the provision and receipt of informational support. There 
are a few tentative explanations for the lowering of stress in the personal identity 
feedback condition. First, in this condition, the participants had the least amount of 
control over the testing situation in comparison to the other experimental conditions. 
This rests upon the following assumptions: (a) the participants received feedback 
from two other individuals who had indicated that they had found the tasks easy and 
thought they had performed in the top 25%, increasing the likelihood of being on the 
video if the participant didn’t cope with the task, (b) the participants indicated they 
had not coped relatively well with the arithmetic tasks, and (c) looking at the other
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experimental conditions, the participants in the personal identity no feedback 
condition did not have to worry about receiving feedback that was performance- 
oriented and participants in the social identity conditions had the benefit of at least 
performing a stressful task in a group setting. Hence, given that participants in the 
personal identity feedback condition had limited control over the situation, it is 
plausible that they may have employed two of the eight discrete coping functions 
highlighted by Folkman et al. (1986) to manage psychological stress. The participants 
may have employed either a self-controlling coping strategy by not endorsing their 
true stress response or alternatively, they may have distanced themselves from the 
testing situation. The above emotion-focused coping strategies have been specified in 
the literature to be of particular relevance to situations that are not amenable to change 
as they offer the potential of at least regulating the emotions associated with these 
situations (Hobfoll & Vaux, 1993). However, none of the manipulation checks 
assessed the possibility of these coping strategies and therefore no corroborating 
evidence can be provided.
The second, and possibly more plausible explanation for the observed finding 
in the personal identity feedback condition is that there was a class effect. The 
feedback in this condition may have reinforced to the participants that they were in 
the same situation as two fellow classmates. Along these lines, the participants may 
have defined themselves as members of the same social category (i.e., year 11 English 
students) and subjectively identified with the two students (ingroup members) and 
shared some emotional involvement in this common definition of themselves (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986). Further, in this condition, the threat instructions indicated that the 
participants may participate in a training video with other individuals (students from 
their class who are ingroup members) to be shown to students from different schools
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(outgroup members). It is likely, that in order to maintain positive self-esteem, in 
particular a positive social identity, and to differentiate themselves from other 
outgroups (i.e., the students from different schools) the participants may have lowered 
their stress response to achieve ingroup superiority (Tajfel et al., 1971). The 
manipulation check for identification indicated that all of the participants identified 
moderately with other students and, importantly, there was also a main effect for 
feedback, with identification being generally higher in the feedback conditions.
The third important point to note, looking at the no feedback conditions, is that 
the stress response (the affective component) did not lower from the first set of 
arithmetic exercises to the second set for participants in the personal identity 
condition but lowered for participants in the social identity condition. This result only 
partially supported the hypothesis that the stress response should not lower when the 
participants receive no feedback. One possible explanation for the lowering of the 
stress response in the social identity condition is that merely performing a stressful 
task as a group (as opposed to performing the task as individuals) can lead to a 
reduction of stress. In this condition, participants performed the task sitting together 
as a group and they may have provided each other with implicit forms of social 
support. For example, they may have provided each other with support via facial 
expressions or by just knowing that they were not facing the potential stressful 
situation on their own. Here, the group may be seen to have a beneficial effect on the 
individual’s self-concept, by influencing the cognitive appraisal and the 
accompanying stress reaction.
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The fact that the stress response did not lower in the personal identity no 
feedback condition provides some support for the assumption that the stress response 
did not lower due to a practice effect. In addition, further support for this conclusion 
comes from an examination of the participants’ performance scores that indicated an 
improvement in all of the participants’ performance during the second set of 
arithmetic tasks. In spite of this, though, there was no difference in the stress 
response for participants in the personal identity no feedback condition. Further, there 
was no difference between the experimental conditions in participants’ interest in the 
study or attention to tasks that may have influenced performance. Nonetheless, even 
if some of the above findings were unexpected, the results provide unequivocal 
support for the view that the stress response did not lower in the experimental 
conditions as a result of a practice effect.
At a theoretical level, the results of this experiment (and the results of the two 
experiments in the previous chapter) place an important caveat on Lazarus and 
Folkman’s (1984) transactional account of the stress process. Instead of asserting that 
a situation will be appraised as stressful when it is relevant and meaningful to an 
individual’s wellbeing, it appears that a more parsimonious account of appraisal 
should refer to the person’s self-concept (which is comprised of both personal and 
social identity). At present, the stress literature considers the impact of a stressor 
from what is largely an individualistic perspective. Little consideration has been 
given to the possibility that the cognitive appraisal process can also be influenced by 
the social context of salient group memberships. Even though this experiment failed 
to manipulate identity-irrelevant stressors successfully, it still demonstrated the effects 
of identity-relevant stressors with participants in both the personal identity and social 
identity conditions being stressed at study phase time 1. In this vein, as predicted by
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self-categorization theory, it can be seen that at different times we categorize 
ourselves as unique individuals and yet, at other times as members of social groups 
both of which are valid expressions of self and can impact upon how we appraise a 
situation (Turner, 1982, 1987, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). Thus, an important 
contribution of this study, notwithstanding the design issues that will be discussed 
shortly, is that a stressor can be perceived as relevant to either an individual’s 
personal identity or social identity. Moreover, this process is dependent upon the 
context and how the self is defined in that context.
From an experimental design viewpoint, this experiment highlights the 
difficult and complex task of integrating Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional 
model of stress and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987, 1991; Turner et al.,
1987). Both models provide an account of two distinct and very different 
psychological processes and the mechanisms behind this integration are yet to be 
clearly specified. The main design issue in this experiment is that the feedback was 
performance-oriented as opposed to being purely supportive. Therefore, the 
performative nature of the feedback may have introduced a comparison of 
performance between individuals or groups that made the testing situation competitive 
and this may have confounded the threat manipulation. Here, then, not only did the 
situation have the potential to cause stress but it was also a competitive situation. 
Moreover, the feedback was intended to be positive in the social identity condition 
(where participants were led to believe that two other group members were doing 
well, thus lowering the potential of being on selected for the video) but not intended 
to be positive in the personal identity condition (particularly if the participants were 
performing badly). Amongst other things, it is difficult to compare the benefits of 
support between conditions if they are intended to be different and it is also likely that
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the participants in the social identity condition may have been demoralised if their 
performance was letting their group down. In hindsight, it would be more valuable 
for further research to keep the nature of the feedback consistent across experimental 
conditions in order to assess the benefits of a shared social identification in the 
provision and receipt of informational support. Moreover, the informational support 
should actually contain information that helps to define, increase the understanding 
of, and help the participants cope with the arithmetic tasks, as opposed to providing 
performance indicators (Cohen & Wills, 1985).
The current theoretical framework would benefit from a further study where 
the feedback is similar to the previous experiments. Consistent with the above line of 
analysis, the manipulation check for feedback indicated that the participants did not 
find the feedback supportive. Finally, the complex design of the current experiment 
should also be avoided in another study by not attempting to manipulate identity­
relevant and identity-irrelevant threat at this stage.
Taken together, this experiment represents a further attempt to clarify the role 
of social identity in the appraisal of stressful situations. However, it is important to 
take a step back and reflect upon the theoretical and methodological lessons learned 
thus far. Even though this experiment has not demonstrated that the impact of a 
stressor varies as a function of its perceived relevance and importance to self (in 
regard to identity-relevant and identity-irrelevant stressors), it does suggest that 
primaiy appraisal entails the relevance of an encounter to one’s personal identity and 
social identity. Clearly, though, further research is warranted and the possible paths 
that this may take will be outlined in the final chapter. The following chapter will 
also consider the broader implications, the current status of our theoretical model and 
the value of the social identity approach and social influence to the study of the stress 
process as a whole.
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CHAPTER SEYEN 
General Discussion
The overall pattern of results from this thesis suggests that any integration of 
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress and self-categorization 
principles (Turner, 1982, 1987, 1991; Turner et al., 1997) will be a far more complex, 
varied and intellectually challenging task than was initially anticipated. Three 
innovative experiments were designed to explore the potential of social identity 
salience to contribute to two different stages of the stress process. The first 
experiment set out to examine the benefits of a shared social identification for the 
provision and receipt of informational support. In short, some tentative support for 
the a priori predictions was provided, with the stress response lowering in the social 
identity condition but this same effect was not observed in the personal identity 
condition. However, low statistical power did not allow for the observation of 
qualifying multivariate effects.
The second experiment attempted to replicate the findings of the first 
experiment but did redress the low statistical power by increasing the sample size and 
improving the manipulation of social identity salience. Here the results showed that 
the benefits of informational support were not dependent upon the appraiser and 
provider sharing a salient social identity. That is, the stress response lowered in both 
the social identity and personal identity conditions. Nevertheless, there was direct 
support for the success of social identity salience and a trend suggesting that the 
participants found the feedback more supportive when they shared a salient social 
identity with the provider. The observed pattern of results in this experiment was
attributed to the poor ecological validity and lack of personal significance and 
relevance of performance on the arithmetic tasks.
The final experiment was designed to (a) control for the possibility of any 
practice effect, (b) improve the ecological validity of performing the arithmetic tasks 
by strengthening the threat manipulation and providing performance oriented 
feedback and finally, (c) test the integration of self-categorization principles at two 
integral stages of the stress process. Specifically, this experiment examined how the 
impact of a stressor varies as a function of its perceived relevance and importance to 
self. In addition, following the social influence tradition of research (and the aims of 
the previous two experiments), this experiment attempted to highlight the benefits of a 
shared social identity in the receipt of informational support. Again though, the 
results of this experiment provided only mixed support for the current theoretical 
framework. Having said that there was some evidence to suggest that the lowering of 
the stress response was not due to a practice effect. However, the role of identity­
relevant and identity-irrelevant threat was not observed. Further, the lowering of the 
stress response was not restricted to the social identity feedback condition.
Importantly though, feedback per se did increase social identification and the stress 
response lowered in conditions of feedback.
Having provided a brief recapitulation of the three experiments presented in 
the empirical chapters, it is now essential to consider the status of the current
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theoretical framework.
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7.1 The status of the theoretical model
One interpretation of the overall findings of this thesis is that any 
amalgamation of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress and 
self-categorization theory is ill-conceived and not feasible. To elaborate this 
argument, these two theoretical models provide accounts of very different and distinct 
psychological processes. Moreover, this thesis has sought to create some synthesis 
among domains that typically have not been considered together. In particular, self­
categorization theory of group behaviour and its explanation of social influence 
considers the processes through which people shape and change the behaviour and 
attitudes of others. In part, the theory postulates that we are more likely to be 
persuaded by others and accept them as legitimate sources of influence, capable of 
validating our perceptions, attitudes and behaviours when we categorize them as 
similar to self (ingroup members). Thus, as different social identities become salient, 
the information to which we are exposed and how the information is construed will 
vary (McGarty et al., 1994; Turner, 1991). Although it may examine the impact of 
the group on the individual it is essentially a theory of group behaviour.
On the other hand, the transactional model of stress provides an account of a 
clinical paradigm and it is essentially a theory of individual differences. The 
centrepiece of this model is the cognitive process of appraisal. According to Lazarus 
and Folkman’s theoretical framework, threat appraisals arise when an individual 
anticipates that he or she will not be able to cope with the stressful event and further, 
failure to met any demand is perceived by the individual as personally meaningful 
(Folkman et al., 1991; Lazarus, 1966). In the literature, the buffering effect model 
asserts that social support may intervene in the cognitive appraisal process by 
alleviating or ameliorating the threat appraisal and accompanying negative emotional
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reactions. The current theoretical framework postulates that it is here where self­
categorization principles may be relevant. Specifically, informational support 
provided by someone we categorize as similar to self may intervene in the stress 
process by validating and clarifying our experience and also assisting in providing 
new interpretations and suggestions for coping. Although this is certainly an 
acceptable analysis, some theorists may question how well self-categorization 
principles and the stress process fit theoretically. In particular, the cognitive 
processes involved in social influence may impact upon the cognitive appraisal of 
stress. However, this does not necessarily mean that these processes will also 
influence emotional reactions. The relationship between cognitive appraisal and 
emotions may be far more complex and intricate than our initial conceptualisation. 
There may be numerous moderating and mediating variables that influence the 
relationship between cognitive appraisal and emotional reaction, which the current 
research has not adequately taken into account. In other words, there may be certain 
intervening variables attached to the paradigm that this research has not examined or 
taken account of.
Lazarus (1991a, 1991b, 1999) provides a detailed analysis of the relationship 
between cognitive appraisal and emotion and the variables that may influence this 
relationship. Essentially, he argues that the direction of the relationship between 
cognition and emotion goes both ways. “Although emotion is always a response to 
meaning, it can also influence subsequent thoughts and emotions” (Lazarus, 1991b, 
p. 824). Lazarus (1991a, 1991b, 1993) highlights six potential key decision 
components of appraisal: three primary and three secondary that may impact upon 
emotion. The primary appraisal components have to do with the motivational aspects 
of an encounter and involve the degree of involvement one has in the outcome of the
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encounter. The three primary appraisals are goal relevance, goal congruence or 
incongruence and goal content. Briefly, goal relevance has to do with what if 
anything is at stake and whether there is potential for any emotion in the encounter. 
The importance or strength of a goal influences the intensity of an emotion. Goal 
congruence or incongruence refers to whether the situation is appraised as harmful or 
beneficial. This conflict-centred principle determines whether the resulting emotion 
will be positive or negative. Finally goal content and commitment entails the type of 
goal to which the individual is committed. The types of goal content Lazarus (1993) 
lists include: (a) self and social esteem, (b) moral values, (c) preservation or 
enhancement of one’s ego identity, (d) meanings and ideas, (e) life goals, and (f) 
persons and their wellbeing.
The three secondary appraisal decisions that influence emotion are blame or 
credit and whether it is directed at oneself or another, coping potential, and future 
expectations. In short, blame or credit concerns the attribution of accountability or 
responsibility for harm. Coping potential has to do with whether and in what way we 
can influence the person-environment relationship for the better. It is here that 
personal resources have an essential role to play. Personal resources may include 
intelligence, social skills, education, supportive family and friends, health and so on 
(Eckenrode, 1991; Folkman etal., 1991; Lazarus, 1999, Moos & Schaefer, 1993). 
Finally, future expectations consist of what the individual thinks will happen in the 
way of change, for example, whether things will work out favourably or get worse for 
any reason. Specifically, our beliefs about ourself and the world shape our 
expectations about what is likely to happen in an encounter and these beliefs are 
heavily influenced by sociocultural variables and individual development (Lazarus, 
1999).
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In addition to the above variables, coping is also an integral part of the process 
of emotional arousal. There are a range of individual cognitions and behaviours that 
represent coping functions. Folkman et al. (1986) conclude that coping to manage or 
alter the problem causing distress and the regulation of emotional responses to the 
problem fall into eight discrete categories. In this particular instance, an assessment 
of emotion-focused coping strategies such as, escape-avoidance, self-controlling, 
distancing and positive reappraisal may shed more light on the relationship between 
appraisal, coping and emotion. In summary, the relationship between appraisal, 
emotion and coping is both complex and intricate and the assessment of some of these 
possible moderating and mediating factors would serve to enhance the current 
theoretical framework.
Alternatively, the present findings may be consistent with Schachter’s (1959) 
application of social comparison theory to the domain of threat and emotion. From 
this standpoint, the lowering of the stress response in the personal identity and social 
identity conditions (in Experiments 2 and 3) provides empirical support for the direct 
role of social comparison processes in ameliorating stress appraisal and reaction.
That is, the uncertainty generated by the possible threatening and novel situation may 
have increased the participants’ motivation to affiliate with one another. Consistent 
with Schachter’s (1959) rationale, people affiliate with similarly-threatened others 
because such individuals are thought to provide the best means of evaluating the 
intensity or appropriateness of their emotional state (Gump & Kulik, 1997). 
Furthermore, by receiving informational feedback or simply observing others, the 
participants may have been able to test out their initial interpretation of the situation 
and/or plans for dealing with the mental arithmetic tasks. Here the individual is
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thought to gain certainty about a threatening situation through comparison with those 
around them.
In addition, this analysis (after Festinger, 1954) is predicated on the premise 
that social influence in its restricted form of informational influence is what impacts 
on the appraisal process. Thus, informational support (regardless of the source) is 
believed to reduce stress simply by providing an individual with relevant facts. In 
other words, the informational support provided in the personal identity and social 
identity conditions may have been accepted as evidence about reality and the 
participants may have only influenced one another by virtue of the (asocial) valid 
information they possessed. In summary, the impact of social support in the appraisal 
of stressful situations may depend simply on the informational content of stress- 
related signs and messages (an individual cognitive process). Finally, the social 
comparison mode of influence may have overridden any self-categorization processes 
of social influence in this particular context.
There is however, another interpretation of the overall findings. In fact, 
although there was only some tentative support for the hypotheses, the current 
theoretical integration of Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) cognitive appraisal of stress 
and self-categorization principles should still be accorded merit. Along these lines, it 
is likely that social identity salience can help further our understanding of why a 
situation is appraised as relevant or irrelevant to an individual. Here, then, primary 
appraisal reflects the personal significance of an encounter to the person’s self- 
concept which may be comprised of a personal identity or social identities. That is, a 
stressor will vary as a function of its perceived relevance and importance to an 
individual’s personal identity or social identity. Furthermore, self-categorization 
principles are likely to provide a fuller account of the factors that determine the
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provision, receipt and benefits of informational support. Specifically, informational 
support should influence the cognitive appraisal process and accompanying emotional 
reaction, when the source and the appraiser share the same social identity. In essence, 
informational support is socially mediated and therefore the value of the support 
depends upon the message content in interaction with the message source.
This is certainly an acceptable theoretical framework but if any progress is to 
be achieved in clearly understanding this integration, the problems encountered in the 
current research need to be examined. Further, there are a number of methodological 
and measurement issues that may have contributed to the outcomes of this study that 
need to be addressed if we are to continue to enhance validity in theory development. 
At this point, it is essential to depend on continued research and further investigation 
to improve our understanding of the above theoretical analysis. Some of the 
measurement and methodological lessons learned from the current research that may 
assist further empirical inquiry will now be reviewed.
7.1.1 Measurement of the stress process
There are essentially two measurement considerations in the current research. 
First, the selection of the self-report measures to assess the affective and somatic 
symptoms of the stress response may not have been the most appropriate. The stress 
process is dynamic, its characteristics can change over time and reappraisal occurs 
continually throughout the person’s interaction with the environment. Thus, assessing 
the stress response at only two intervals during the experimental paradigm may not 
have provided an adequate reflection of the person’s stress reaction. In addition, the 
lack of consistent findings in regard to the participants’ assessment of their somatic 
symptoms tends to highlight the subjective nature of the chosen measures.
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In summary, the subjective nature of the current measures and their inability to 
capture the evolving stress equation demonstrates the need for future research to 
rethink the choice of stress measurement. It would appear fruitful to include a more 
accurate indication of the physiological stress reactions associated with cognitive 
appraisal. Numerous experiments have demonstrated that cognitive appraisal affects 
physiological and psychological responses to stressors. Importantly, the continuous 
recording of skin conductance, pulse rate time and heart rate throughout the entire 
experimental paradigm would need to provide a clearer indication of the physiological 
fluctuations experienced by participants and the relationship between appraisal and 
reappraisal (Tomaka et al., 1993). Finally, the inclusion of questions to assess the 
participants’ primary appraisal by asking them how stressful or threatening they 
expect to find the upcoming arithmetic task would provide an indication of how 
involving and meaningful the situation is to them in the first place (Monroe & Kelley, 
1995; Tomaka etal., 1993).
Second, the measures assessing the stress response were introspective. That 
is, the questions asked participants to indicate their agreement with statements that 
assessed how they as individuals felt during the arithmetic tasks. For example, one 
question stated T was more worried than I normally am’, and another question stated 
‘my heart was pounding more than it normally does’. The participants were asked to 
reflect upon their own feelings as unique individuals. Therefore, it is highly probable 
that in the social identity salience conditions, self-perception changed from the 
participants defining themselves as group members to defining themselves as 
individuals (Turner, 1982, 1984; Turner et al., 1987). It is essential to recall that the 
way in which people categorize themselves is highly variable, fluid and context 
dependent. Upon reflection, the measures that assessed the stress response may have
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impacted on the process of depersonalization in the social identity conditions. To 
elaborate this argument, the manipulation of social identity salience attempted to 
change the level and content of the participants’ self-perception. If the manipulation 
of social identity salience was successful (and there is evidence to suggest that this 
was the case in Experiment 2), participants would have categorized themselves more 
in terms of interchangeable representatives of some shared social category 
membership and less in terms of unique attributes and individual differences (Levine 
& Reicher, 1996; Turner & Haslarn, 2001). However, the stress measures assessed 
for unique and individual differences and therefore, there may have been a shift in 
self-perception from seeing oneself as a member of a group to an individual person 
(i.e., ‘we’ to T). Alternative measures should avoid introspection and avoid asking 
participants to evaluate their own feelings and stress response. More appropriate 
measures could be the aforementioned recording of skin conductance, pulse rate and 
heart rate. In addition, participants may complete these measures as a group and 
assess how they feel as a member of a group. For example, a question may state, “we 
were more worried than normal”. In essence, these measures would avoid the 
individual’s introspective evaluation of their feelings and likely shift in self­
perception in the social identity condition.
7.1.2 Methodological issues
As well as measurement issues, there are a number of design issues that need 
to be addressed. Importantly, the first methodological consideration is that there may 
simply be limits to the application of the social psychological experimental paradigm. 
Specifically, the experimental paradigm used to manipulate social identity salience in 
social psychological research may not be the most suitable procedure to adopt when
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examining the relationship between self-categorization principles and the stress 
process. In other words, although extensive research has demonstrated the validity of 
using similar experimental procedures for demonstrating self-categorization principles 
and self-categorization principles in social influence (Mackie et al., 1990; McGarty et 
al., 1994, Oakes et al., 1991) these procedures may not be suited to the examination of 
the stress process.
Second, the ecological validity of the current research paradigm was low.
Poor performance on arithmetic tasks in an experimental constructed situation may 
not have been of any personal significance or relevance to the participants. At the 
most fundamental level, the sample may have had no interest in the long-term effects 
of its performance or any interest in the experimenter’s evaluation. Importantly, the 
participants’ self-reported stress response (in all of the experiments conducted) was 
only ever moderate. Changing the nature of the stressor or selecting participants with 
moderate to high trait anxiety and poor coping strategies may have increased the 
severity of threat appraisal.
Alternatively, a more realistic setting and the selection of pre-existing work 
groups might possibly be a better way to examine the theoretical framework. 
Specifically, in this instance the stress response would not be directly manipulated 
and there is the added bonus of ecological validity. In particular, the effect of high 
and low identification with coworkers on the provision and receipt of informational 
support could be examined within a workplace context. It is likely, that if individuals 
internalise their workplace social category as an aspect of their self-concept and 
subjectively identify with the ingroup, they would benefit from the provision of 
informational support. On the other hand, if individuals fail to identify with their 
coworkers, the provision of informational support would play a negligible role in
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ameliorating workplace stress related-signs and messages. The core of this analysis is 
similar to James’ (1995, 1997) application of social identity theory to explain the 
status of and health-related outcomes for minority workers in majority dominated 
organisations.
Additionally, the effectiveness of the current experimental procedure to 
maintain sufficient intensity in the stress response over the two sets of arithmetic tasks 
is questionable. Although the stress response may have not lowered because of a 
practice effect or improvement in performance perse , a familiarity with the task over 
time could have alleviated anxiety. In a similar vein, there are doubts about the 
experimental effectiveness and validity of studies using mood induction techniques to 
induce positive and negative mood states. Some authors question whether sufficient 
intensity of mood is induced, while others consider the possibility that the observed 
effectiveness is due mainly to demand characteristics of the experimental situation 
(Westermann, Spies, Stahld & Hesse, 1980).
Third, the feedback employed in the present research may not have provided 
the participants with any relevant information that was likely to assist them in 
defining and increasing their understanding of the situation. Further, the simplistic 
nature of the informational support (e.g., T found the task quite hard’ and ‘it was good 
when it stopped’) provided no information as to how the participants could cope with 
the stressor. In future experimental inquiry, the nature of the information provided 
should be considered carefully.
Finally, inclusion of measures to assess for different coping strategies may 
have enhanced the interpretation of the findings. It is plausible to suggest that the 
participants may have employed any one of the eight discrete coping functions 
highlighted by Folkman et al. (1986) to manage the testing situation.
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Having reviewed a number of unforeseen methodological and measurement 
issues, the current theoretical model is in a far better position to be tested in future 
research. It is still the contention of this thesis that self-categorization theory and its 
explanation of social influence has a great deal to offer the stress literature. 
Importantly, there was some tentative support for the hypotheses to warrant further 
research and the paths that this may take have been specified above.
7.2 Summary
In summary, the current research was highly innovative and exploratory. 
Moreover, it was the first of its kind to integrate a clinical psychological paradigm 
with a group-based social influence process. With this in mind, it was highly 
probable that uncertainties and problems in this area of research would arise.
However, awareness of the formidable uncertainties and problems in this area of 
research should not discourage further research. The research presented in this thesis 
has only scratched the surface in attempting to successfully integrate Lazarus and 
Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress and self-categorization theory (Turner, 
1987, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). There is good reason to believe that as more is 
learned about this integration and if the present methodological and measurement 
considerations are resolved this approach would provide a more parsimonious account 
of cognitive appraisal of stress.
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) work that developed from a critique of 
traditional stimulus and response approaches to stress, is one of the most influential 
and valuable models of the stress process thus far. The concept of cognitive appraisal 
has furthered our understanding of how a person interprets and constructs meaning 
from a stressful situation and what the situation may signify for their personal
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wellbeing. When the importance of the individual’s interpretation is acknowledged in 
the stress process we start to gain some understanding of individual differences and 
why two individuals may display different emotional responses to the same situation. 
This finds related support in the clinical psychology field. In particular, cognitive 
therapy and its treatment of psychological dysfunction examines the cognitive 
processes that contribute to maladaptive emotional and behavioural responses 
(Monroe & Kelley, 1995). At present, though, the stress process has been 
conceptualised from what is largely an individual level of psychological analysis. 
Some reference has been made to the potential for social factors to impact on the 
stress process in the coping and social support literature. However, a truly social 
psychological explanation is yet to be provided. This thesis asserts that the meaning 
of stress and the social interaction that surrounds it is bound up with individuals’ 
social identities. Thus, our understanding of the stress process can only be furthered 
if we examine the social psychological mechanisms involved in the transactional 
equation of stress. The process of cognitive appraisal and how this impacts on the 
person’s wellbeing (at a personal and social level) is influenced by the social context 
of salient social group memberships in which individuals find themselves. Therefore, 
it is essential to examine how the stress process and social psychological principles 
can come together to provide an explanation of psychological wellbeing and
emotional reaction.
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APPENDIX A
A study of performance
Your Code No:
People differ from each other in all kinds of ways, and every person is a unique 
individual. One person loves music and another likes to go for a walk, and another 
likes to read whereas another likes to go out. How do people differ from you?
1. What are your hobbies?.................................................................................
2. In what year were you bom? _
3. Are you concerned with your general appearance?........................................
Indicate your agreement with the following items by circling one number on each 
scale
1. On the whole I am satisfied with myself
Do not agree 1 2  3 4  5 6
at all
2. At times I think I am no good at all
Do not agree 1 2  3 4  5 6
at all
3. I feel I do not have much to be proud of
Do not agree 1 2  3 4  5 6
at all
4. I take a positive attitude towards myself
Do not agree 1 2  3 4  5 6
at all
5. I certainly feel useless at times
Do not agree 1 2 3 4  5 6
at all
6. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure
Do not agree 1 2  3 4  5 6
at all
7. I wish I could have more respect for myself
1 2  3 4  5 6
7  Agree completely
7  Agree completely
7  Agree completely
7  Agree completely
7 Agree completely
7  Agree completely
7Do not agree 
at all
Please do not turn the page until instructed
Agree completely
158
SETI SET 2
2 .
3 .
4 .
5 .
6 .
7 .
8. 
9 . 
10 
11 
12
13
14
15
1 .
16 .
Indicate your agreement with each of the following statements describing your 
feelings during the arithmetic task by circling one number on each scale.
1. I was more worried than I normally am.
Do not agree 1 2  3 4  5 6 7
at all
2. I felt more nervous and ill at ease than I normally do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
at all
3. I had more difficulty concentrating than I normally do. 
Do not agree 1 2  3 4  5 6  7
at all
4. I felt more anxious than I normally do.
Do not agree 1 2  3 4  5 6  7
at all
5. My face was more flushed than it normally is.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4  5 6  7
at all
6. My heart was pounding more than it normally does.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
at all
7. I felt more discomfort in my stomach than I usually do. 
Do not agree 1 2  3 4  5 6  7
at all
Agree completely
Agree completely
Agree completely
Agree completely
Agree completely
Agree completely
Agree completely
Please do not turn over the page until instructed
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SET 1 SET 2
2 .
3 .
4 .
5 .
6 .
7 .
8 .
9 .
10 . 
11 
12
13
14
15
1 .
16 .
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Indicate your agreement with each of the following statements describing your 
feelings during the arithmetic task by circling one number on each scale.
1. I was more worried than I normally am.
D o not agree 1 2 3 4  5 6  7
at all
2. I felt more nervous and ill at ease than I normally do.
A gree com pletely
Do not agree 1 2  3  4  5  6  7
at all
3. I had more difficulty concentrating than I normally do.
A gree com pletely
Do not agree 1 2  3  4  5  6  7
at all
4. I felt more anxious than I normally do.
Agree com pletely
D o not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
at all
5. My face was more flushed than it normally is.
A gree com pletely
D o not agree 1 2  3  4  5  6  7
at all
6. My heart was pounding more than it normally does.
A gree com pletely
Do not agree 1 2  3  4  5  6  7
at all
7. I felt more discomfort in my stomach than I usually do.
A gree com pletely
D o not agree 1 2  3  4  5  6  7
at all
A gree com pletely
8. While conducting the tasks, did you feel that you had anything in common 
with any of the other students taking part in the study?
N othing in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
com m on
9. I identify with the other students in the room.
A  lot in 
com m on
D o not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
identify
S trongly
identify
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10. Did you find the feedback from the other student helpful?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
11. How were you able to cope with the mental arithmetic tasks?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely well
12. How would you describe yourself generally?
I am extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1  am extremely 
relaxed stressed
13. How interested were you in this study?
Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
14. How much attention did you devote to the study’s instructions and tasks?
No attention 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A lot of attention
15. I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
16. On the whole I am satisfied with myself.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
17. In general, I am glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
18. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree
Finally, please respond to the following
How old are you?_______yrs
What is your sex? (please circle) Male or Female
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APPENDIX B
Arithmetic task 1
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
1) 47 + 52 96-64
2) 23 + 75 88-59
3) 75 + 96 78-65
4) 67 + 67 56-29
5) 84 + 47 48-31
6) 88 + 15 97-27
7) 43 + 72 31 - 16
8) 88 + 68 48-24
9) 14 + 59 43-37
10) 58 + 47 85-74
11) 33+73 95-41
12) 42 + 84 86-65
13) 61 + 13 72-35
14) 97+71 51 - 18
15) 72 + 79 74-48
16) 38+41 76-67
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Arithmetic task 2
Exercise 1 Exercise 2
1) 96 + 64 52-47
2) 55 + 85 75-23
3) 75 + 68 96-75
4) 59 + 49 76-67
5) 31 +48 84-47
6) 97 + 27 88-15
7) 31 + 16 72-43
8) 48 + 24 88-68
9) 43 + 37 59-14
10) 85 + 74 58-47
11) 41 +95 73-33
12) 86 + 66 84-42
13) 72 + 35 61 - 13
14) 51 + 18 97-71
15) 74 + 48 79-27
16) 76 + 76 41 -28
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APPENDIX C
Your Code No:
A study of performance
In this study you will be asked to perform a number of tasks. 
Before you do, please read the following questions:
• List up to three things that you and the members of your group do relatively often
1) ....................................... 2) .......................................  3 ....................................
• List up to three things that you and the members of your group do relatively rarely
1) ....................................... 2) ........................................  3 ..................................
• List up to three things that you and the members of your group generally do well
1) .......................................  2) ....................................... 3) ..................................
• List up to three things that you and the members of your group generally do badly
1) .......................................  2) ....................................... 3) ....................................
Write a short paragraph, indicating what you like about your group
Your group’s nickname:
Please do not turn over the page until instructed
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Your group’s nickname:
SET 1 SET 2
2 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
5 .
6 .
7 .
8 .
9 .
10 . 
11 . 
12
13
14
15
16.
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Your group’s nickname:
Indicate your agreement with each of the following statements describing your 
feelings during the arithmetic task by circling one number on each scale.
1. I was more worried than I normally am.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
2. I felt more nervous and ill at ease than I normally do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
3. I had more difficulty concentrating than I normally do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
4. I felt more anxious than I normally do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
5. My face was more flushed than it normally is.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
6. My heart was pounding more than it normally does.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
7. I felt more discomfort in my stomach than I usually do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
Please do not turn over the page until instructed
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Your group’s nickname:
SET 1 SET 2
2 .
2 .
3 .
4 .
5 .
6 .
7 .
8 .
9 .
10.
11.
12.
13
14
15
16 .
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Your group’s nickname:
Indicate your agreement with each of the following statements describing your 
feelings during the arithmetic task by circling one number on each scale.
1. I was more worried than I normally am.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
2. I felt more nervous and ill at ease than I normally do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
3. I had more difficulty concentrating than I normally do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
4. I felt more anxious than I normally do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
5. My face was more flushed than it normally is.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
6. My heart was pounding more than it normally does.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
7. I felt more discomfort in my stomach than I usually do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
8. While conducting the tasks, did you feel that you had anything in common 
with any of the other students taking part in the study?
Nothing in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A lot in
common common
9. I identify with the other students in the room.
Do not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly
identify identify
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10. Did you find the feedback from the other student helpful?
Not at all 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Extremely
11. How were you able to cope with the mental arithmetic tasks?
Not at all 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Extremely well
12. How would you describe yourself generally?
I am extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 lam  extremely
relaxed stressed
13. How interested were you in this study?
Not at all 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Extremely
14. How much attention did you devote to the study’s instructions and tasks?
No attention 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 A lot of attention
15. I often regret that I belong to some of the social groups I do.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
16. On the whole I am satisfied with myself.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
17. In general, I am glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
at all
18. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree completely
Finally, please respond to the following
How old are you?_______yrs
What is your sex? (please circle) Male or Female
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APPENDIX D
Table D l
Univariate Tests of Self-Defmition and Feedback for the Manipulation Checks
IV DV F df E
Self-Definition Common with Other
Participants 0.76 (1/74) ns
Performance of Others
Important 0.02 (1/74) ns
Identify 1.86 (1/74) ns
Cope with Tasks 0.67 (1/74) ns
General Stress 2.33 (1/74) ns
Attention to Tasks 0.23 (1/74) ns
Be in Video 0.62 (1/74) ns
Personal Self-Esteem 1.02 (1/74) ns
Feedback Common with Other
Participants 0.34 (1/74) ns
Performance of Others
Important 0.01 (1/74) ns
Identify 5.37 (1/74) <.05
Cope with Tasks 0.09 (1/74) ns
General Stress 0.18 (1/74) ns
Attention to Tasks 0.02 (1/74) ns
Be in Video 0.03 (1/74) ns
Personal Self-Esteem 1.51 (1/74) ns
Self-Definition Common with Other
Feedback Participants 0.45 (1/74) ns
Performance of Others
Important 1.90 (1/74) ns
Identify 3.09 (1/74) 0.08
Cope with Tasks 0.09 (1/74) ns
General Stress 0.18 (1/74) ns
Attention to Tasks 0.02 (1/74) ns
Be in Video 0.03 (1/74) ns
Personal Self-Esteem 2.17 (1/74) ns
